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INTRODUCTION
Comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms under both the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' in its Chapter
20 and the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in the Understanding
on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
("Dispute Settlement Understanding" or "DSU") have provided the
three NAFTA governments-the United States, Canada, and Mex-
ico-with choice of forum alternatives that effectively do not exist
for any other group of nations. The overlapping or common substan-
tive provisions of the two trade regimes, along with subtle differ-
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 (chs. 1-9); 32 I.L.M. 605 (chs. 10-22) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 353, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
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ences in jurisdiction, procedures, and substantive content, are pro-
viding opportunities and challenges for the government trade attor-
neys of all three nations in deciding how best to resolve disputes
among the three nations. Are the choices really as broad as they ap-
pear, or in many instances are they more apparent than real? Does
one mechanism offer more opportunity for political manipulation or
delays than the other? Does the quality of the analysis and decision-
making differ as between the two entities? Is one mechanism more
successful than the other in ensuring "enforcement" of decisions?
What are the implications, if any, of decisions rendered under the
Chapter 20 mechanisms for the NAFTA Parties' non-NAFTA trad-
ing partners? Is it too easy for Parties to bring multiple actions in
parallel fora? Finally, what factors should influence NAFTA member
government decisions and the efforts of private parties to "encour-
age" their respective governments to defend important interests with
regard to which forum is selected?
Despite the enormous intra-regional trade' within the NAFTA,
only a limited number of trade disputes among NAFTA members
have reached even the consultation stage under either NAFTA
Chapter 20 (eleven) or the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (five)."
However, forum choices may be instructive even in the many in-
stances where the disputes are resolved without resort to arbitration
or are delayed. This limited body of jurisprudence, which includes
three final arbitral panel decisions, thus provides a basis for a com-
parison of the two systems and an initial appraisal of the jurisdic-
tional conflicts and choice of forum opportunities and risks presented
to the NAFTA governments.
3. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, United States Foreign Trade Data (last up-
dated July 15, 1998) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth-tabcon.html>
(providing United States aggregate foreign trade data). Intra-regional trade was
valued at S482 billion in 1997, S157 billion worth between Mexico and the United
States, S320 billion worth between Canada and the United States, and S5 million
between Canada and Mexico. See Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, Fact Sheet-Mexico (visited Jan. 9, 1999) <http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/mexico/fact-e.asp> (listing and valuing Canadian exports to Mexico
and imports from Mexico). The United States is both Canada and Mexico's largest
trading partner based on dollar volume of trade; Canada is the United States' larg-
est trading partner, while Mexico is third, after Japan. See id.
4. See infi-a Part II (presenting analyses of cases before the NAFTA and WTO
dispute settlement mechanisms).
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Part I of this article describes and analyzes the government-to-
government trade dispute settlement provisions offered by the
NAFTA and the WTO, respectively, focusing on jurisdictional and
procedural aspects. Part II reviews the Chapter 20 and WTO consul-
tations and panel decisions to date. Part III analyzes the significant
differences in the processes and the approaches of the NAFTA gov-
ernments, concentrating on the relative advantages and disadvantages
of the two mechanisms. Part IV proposes suggested guidelines to fo-
rum selection to be applied on a case-by-case basis by the NAFTA
Parties in future disputes.
I. THE NAFTA AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISMS
The area of international trade law is the only one in which bind-
ing dispute resolution is available to most members of the interna-
tional trading community-the members of the World Trade Organi-
zation.' A prominent scholar has stated that "[t]he dispute settlement
procedures in the 1994 WTO Agreement are the most ambitious
worldwide system for the settlement of disputes among more than
130 states ever adopted in the history of international law."6 Al-
though the Statute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") pro-
vides for the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, less than fifty
states have accepted such jurisdiction, and less than one hundred
cases have been referred to the ICJ in the first fifty years of its exis-
tence.7 Recent efforts to create an international criminal tribunal re-
sulted in the conclusion of a treaty creating such a court, although the
5. See WTO, About the WTO: The Organization, The Members (last modified
Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/organsn6.htm> (listing the current
134 members).
6. Ernst-Ulrich Petersman, From the Hobbesian International Law of Coex-
istence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System, I J.
INT'L ECON. L. 175, 183 (1998).
7. See International Court of Justice, Response of the International Court of
Justice to General Assembly Resolution 52/161 of December 15, 1997 (visited Feb.
9, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/icy/igeneral/information/igeninfvarious/respon-
sega/51297> (commenting on the effect of an increased caseload by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice). While there are currently ten cases before the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), in the 1970s the typical ICJ docket consisted of two cases.
See id.
1028 [14:1025
NAFTA/WTO CHOICE OF FORUM
United States opposed the agreement.! There is, however, no tribunal
with global jurisdiction over human rights disputes.9 In contrast,
during the first three years and eight months of the existence of the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, members lodged nearly one hun-
dred and fifty requests for consultations, forty of which have re-
sulted-through consultation or adjudication-in an order directing a
change in national trade law or policy."0
For the United States, Mexico, and Canada there are two options
in many instances-the WTO and the NAFTA mechanisms. The
NAFTA Chapter 20 mechanism is similar in scope and jurisdiction to
the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, whereas NAFTA's
Chapter 19 incorporates a more limited scope-antidumping and
countervailing duty matters-and operates under national rather than
regional or international trade laws.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE Two SYSTEMS
The NAFTA and its two "parallel" agreements on labor" and the
environment 2 incorporate a broad and sometimes confusing variety
8. See Michael P. Scharf Results of the Rome Conference for an International
C'rininal Court, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHT 0ast modified Aug. 1998)
<http://vww.asil.org/insigh23.htm> (analyzing the provisions of the International
Criminal Court and the United States' reasons for opposition). See generally Cara
Levy Rodriguez, Comment, Slaying the Monster: Wy the United States Should
Not Support the Rone Treaty, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 805 (1999) (detailing the
criticisms of the Rome Treaty establishing the United Nations International Crimi-
nal Court).
9. See generally A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EUROPE 250-315 (3d ed. 1985) (describing such regional arrangements as the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
and their roles in human rights protection).
10. See also WTO, Overview of the State-of-play of 07O Disputes (as modi-
fied Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.vto.orgtwtoldisputelbulletin.htm> [hereinafter
WTO Dispute Overview]; Chad Bowman, Dispute Settlement: Experts Say 1;70
Dispute Settlement Slow Ill-Defined, Often Unsuccessful, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA) (Oct. 30, 1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (citing remarks by
Andrew W. Shoyer, a former United States Legal Adviser to the United States
Mission to the WTO in Geneva, and discussing criticisms of the WTO dispute set-
tlement process).
11. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1502.
12. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993,
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of mechanisms for resolving disputes relating to the interpretation
and application of certain NAFTA provisions in specific situations.
The principal dispute resolution provisions relate to: investment
(Chapter 11), financial services (Chapter 14), interpretation and ap-
plication of the agreement generally (Chapter 20), appeals of unfair
trade actions (Chapter 19), failure to enforce environmental laws
(North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation), and
failure to enforce labor laws (North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation). In addition, the NAFTA includes commitments to
steps that will facilitate alternative resolution of commercial and ag-
ricultural disputes in the future. 3 For purposes of this article and
comparisons with the WTO mechanisms, only the Chapter 20
mechanism, and to a lesser degree, the Chapter 19 binational panel
process for review of national agency determinations in unfair trade
matters-antidumping and subsidies-are relevant.
Chapter 20 of the NAFTA provides a means for resolving disputes
among the NAFTA governments over the application and interpreta-
tion of the NAFTA. Chapter 20 calls for consultation between the
Parties, conciliation before the "Free Trade Commission"'4 arbitra-
tion, and ultimately, implementation of the arbitral report.'" It was
modeled after Chapter 18 of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement ("CFTA"),' 6 with certain modifications "that should fa-
cilitate and expedite the settlement of disputes between the three
countries,"' 7 and, to some extent, the pre-1995 General Agreement on
32 I.L.M. 1482.
13. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 707, 2022.
14. The "Free Trade Commission" consists of the trade ministers of the three
NAFTA countries. See infra Part I.C (describing the composition and duties of the
Free Trade Commission).
15. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2006-17.
16. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
[hereinafter CFTA].
17. North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Statement of Administra-
tive Action, reprinted in 1 JAMES R. HOLBEIN & DONALD J. MUscH, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTs, BOOKLET 8, at 190 (1994) [hereinafter
Statement of Administrative Action]. Among the most significant changes is the
elimination of the distinction of the mandatory panel process and "binding arbitra-
tion," which under the CFTA could be agreed to independently of the panel proc-
ess as an alternative. See CFTA, supra note 16, art. 1806.
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Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') Article XXIII procedures."' CFTA,
Chapter 18, includes essentially the same choice of forum legislation
as NAFTA, Chapter 20.'9
Both the WTO and the NAFTA mechanisms are at least nominally
legalistic or "rule oriented" systems, which incorporate a formal ad-
judicatory decision-making process and effective enforcement
mechanisms,2° as distinct from more pragmatic and flexible models
that rely upon diplomatic negotiations between treaty partners-or
political power 2-to resolve conflicts over the interpretation and ap-
plication of international agreements.2" The choice between a mecha-
nism designed to provide compromise settlements, at the expense of
specific norms, and rule-based decisions that will serve the goals of
long-term predictability and efficiency,-' has been decisively re-
solved in favor of the latter.'4
Thus, the formal, legalistic dispute settlement approach favored by
the United States, with strict time limits, prevailed, even though
some members probably would have preferred a more informal, con-
18. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
19. Compare CFTA, supra note 16, art. 1801, with NAFTA, supra note 1, ch.
20.
20. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 3-5 (1970) (comparing legalism and pragmatism with respect to
international agreements).
21. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109 (1989) (sug-
gesting that a reformed GATT dispute settlement system should encourage settle-
ment "primarily with reference to the existing agreed rules rather than simply with
reference to the relative economic or other power which the disputants possess").
22. See OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 61-64 (1985) (explaining that a balance of prag-
matism and legalism should be used when dealing with international trade dis-
putes); see also David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407, 408 (1993).
23. See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law,
18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 122-24 (1992) (discussing the GATT's role as a source
of substantive legal rules versus the GATT's role as a forum for negotiation).
24. See Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement: The First Three Years, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 199, 200 (1998)
(noting that the Dispute Settlement Understanding "contains certain remarkable
innovations that take the system in a more legalistic direction").
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ciliation-oriented consensus-based approach, similar to that used un-
der the GATT prior to 1995.25 The largely ad hoc dispute settlement
mechanism that evolved under the authority of GATT Article XXIII
has been replaced by a unitary, detailed, and comprehensive dispute
resolution system created by the WTO's DSU, 6 which applies to the
full range of binding international trade rules encompassed by the
WTO. In fact, the Uruguay Round negotiations leading to the WTO
also resulted in greatly expanded coverage of international trade
rules, including trade in agricultural and non-agricultural goods,
trade in services, intellectual property, and, to a limited extent, trade-
related investment issues, among others. As a result, the number of
trade barriers that are not subject to the discipline of binding interna-
tional trade rules declined significantly.
B. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute resolution
mechanism is defined as follows:
Except for the matters covered in Chapter Nineteen (Review and Dispute
Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters) and as oth-
erwise provided in this Agreement, the dispute settlement provisions of
25. See generally Richard 0. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION ch. 16 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996). Compare GATT, supra note
18, with DSU, supra note 2.
26. See DSU, supra note 2 (establishing the rules and procedures under the
GATT); see also Andrew W. Shoyer, The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Set-
tlement: Observations and Suggestions, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 277, 283 (1998) (ob-
serving that fears of increased "legalism" that would make the system too rigid
have not been realized).
27. See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, FINAL
ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 283, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1168 (1994); Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, FINAL ACT
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 319, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]; WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 43.
28. See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW 1064 (1998).
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this Chapter shall apply with respect to the avoidance of settlement of all
disputes between the Parties regarding the interpretation of application of
this Agreement or wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed
measure of another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations
of this Agreement or cause nullification or impairment in the sense of
Annex 2004.29
The subject matter coverage is broad for two reasons. First, the
NAFTA's coverage itself is expansive. The NAFTA applies not only
to trade in goods, specifically including automobiles, "" textiles," en-
ergy, and basic petrochemicals, 2 but to customs procedures," agri-
culture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures," and safeguards and
technical barriers to trade. 5 The NAFTA contains special provisions
on safeguards, 6 government procurement,"' cross border trade,"' tele-
communications39 and financial services.a Foreign investment is
protected,4' as are intellectual property rights; 2 furthermore, there is
limited coverage for competition policy' and business travel.44 Al-
though special dispute settlement procedures are afforded to private
parties with investment disputes against governments' or antidump-
29. NAFTA, sup
30. Seeid. ch. 3,
31. See id. ch. 3,
32. See id. ch. 6.
33. See id. ch. 5.
34. See id. ch. 7.
35. See NAFTA,
36. See id. ch. 8.
37. See id. cl. l0
38. See id. ch. 12
39. See id. ch. 12
40. See id. ch. 14
41. See NAFTA,
42. See id. ch. l7
43. See id. oh. 15
44. See id. ch.16
45. See id. ch. 11
ra note 1, art. 2004.
Annex 300-A.
Annex 300-B.
supra note 1, ch. 9.
I.
supra note 1, ch. 11.
sec. B.
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ing and countervailing duty determination challenges,46 questions re-
lating to the interpretation or application of those sections of the
NAFTA are also cognizable under the Chapter 20 mechanisms.
Second, with certain exceptions, "disputes regarding any matter
arising under both this Agreement and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any suc-
cessor agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at the dis-
cretion of the complaining Party. ' '47 Where a NAFTA Party decides
to initiate a GATT/WTO action against another NAFTA Party, and a
third NAFTA Party expresses an interest and a preference for
NAFTA dispute settlement, consultations are to take place, and "the
dispute normally shall be settled under this Agreement [NAFTA]. ' 48
Certain types of disputes must be settled under the NAFTA's
Chapter 20 rather than under the GATT/WTO mechanism, including
conflicts between the NAFTA and bilateral or multilateral environ-
mental agreements listed in Article 104; 4' disputes under the NAFTA
Chapters 7 (sanitary and phytosanitary measures) and 9 (standards-
related measures) relating to human, animal, or plant life, or health,
or protection of the environment, or raising factual issues concerning
the environment, health, safety, or conservation, including directly
related scientific matters.5 In addition, there are certain areas cov-
ered by the NAFTA on which the WTO is silent. These include the
regional tariff reduction measures (Chapter 3) and rules of origin
(Chapter 4), as well as, NAFTA-specific customs measures (Chapter
5);51 most investment measures (Chapter 11); competition (Chapter
15); and business travel (Chapter 16). If a matter does not arise under
46. See id. ch.19; see also infra Part II.A.3 (discussing a dispute over United
States import restrictions).
47. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005.1.
48. Id. art. 2005.2.
49. See id. art. 2005.
50. See id. art. 2005.4.
51. Arguably, a NAFTA Party might contend that an action under Chapters 3-5
is a violation of GATT Article XXIV relating to free trade areas and customs un-
ions. However, the NAFTA party is less likely to proceed with this argument than
a non-NAFTA, WTO Member who may be concerned that a NAFTA provision is
inconsistent with a NAFTA party's GATT obligations.
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both the NAFTA and the GATT-only under the NAFTA-it must
be submitted to NAFTA procedures.
The WTO's DSU applies to "disputes brought pursuant to the con-
sultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed
in Annex 1.,,52 Generally, Annex 1 includes the Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, the multilateral trade agree-
ments, as well as the agreements relating to services and intellectual
property. Specifically, the agreements include the GATT 1994 and
the agreements on agriculture; sanitary and phytosanitary measures;
textiles and clothing; technical barriers to trade; trade related invest-
ment measures; antidumping; customs valuation; rules of origin; sub-
sidies and countervailing measures; and safeguards." The WTO pro-
cedures also apply to so-called "non-violation," or existence of any
other situation, "nullification and impairment" complaints, but with
procedures that are in the nature of recommendations rather than
binding decisions.'
The most important areas in which WTO jurisdiction is effectively
exclusive for government to government disputes, absent some sort
of ad hoc agreement to the contrary," are dumping and subsidies.
Under the NAFTA, "[e]ach Party reserves the right to apply its anti-
dumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from
52. DSU, supra note 2, art. 1.1.
53. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annexes IA, lB, IC. DSU coverage
extends to the "plurilateral trade agreements," such as the Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement, of which Canada and the United States, but not Mexico, are
parties. See id. art. XXII.
54. See DSU, supra note 2, art. XXVI.
55. See, e.g., Softwood Lumber Agreement, May 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1195
(providing an example of an ad hoc agreement, which protects the United States'
softvood lumber industry from Canadian imports). With this agreement, the par-
ties sought to resolve a long-running United States countervailing duty case be-
tween the United States and Canada. See id. The Agreement contains an ad hoc
dispute settlement mechanism based in part on NAFTA Chapter 20 concepts to re-
solve differences over the interpretation of the Agreement. See id. art. V. The
Agreement purports to limit Canadian softwood lumber imports into the United
States by regulating subsidies to those exports. See id. Furthermore, it restricts the
United States' countervailing duty proceedings against softwood lumber, "without
prejudice to the position of either Party as to whether the programs and practices of
either Party in respect of forest management constitute countervailable subsidies
under domestic or international law." Id. art. VII(I).
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the territory of any other Party."56 Each NAFTA Party also reserves
the right to change or modify its antidumping and countervailing
duty laws.57
While this right of amendment is explicitly made subject to certain
conditions, including the proviso that such amendment is not incon-
sistent with the GATT, the GATT Dumping or Subsidies Codes or
any successor agreements-the WTO Antidumping and Subsidies
Agreements 58-the review of antidumping and countervailing duty
matters is explicitly excluded from the scope of Chapter 20.9 One
might argue that the affirmation by the NAFTA Parties of "their ex-
isting rights and obligations with respect to each other under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other agreements to
which such Parties are party,' ' 0 which necessarily includes the GATT
provisions on antidumping and subsidies-Articles VI and XVI-
and the WTO Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements, provides a
colorable basis for Chapter 20 action in antidumping matters not
explicitly covered by Chapter 19. However, this clearly was not the
intent of the Parties.'
There are also several areas that are explicitly excluded from
Chapter 20 coverage, and by their subject matter would not come
within the WTO framework. These areas include issues relating to
the NAFTA's limited coverage of competition policy 62 and certain
decisions regarding whether to permit foreign investment under the
Investment Canada Act, Mexico's National Commission on Foreign
Investment, and the United States Exon-Florio legislation. 3
Nevertheless, the category of disputes potentially regarding any
matter arising under both the NAFTA and the WTO is broad. First,
56. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1902.1.
57. See id. art. 1902.2
58. See id. art. 1902.2(d)(i).
59. See id. art. 2004.
60. Id. art. 103.1.
61. See Telephone Interview with a senior Canadian trade official (Nov. 16,
1998) [hereinafter Canadian Official Interview] (transcript on file with American
University International Law Review).
62. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1501(3).
63. See id. Annex 1138.2 (excluding review of investment exclusions on na-
tional security grounds).
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many GATT/WTO rules are incorporated by reference into the
NAFTA. For example, in the NAFTA, "[t]he Parties affirm their ex-
isting rights and obligations with respect to each other under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other agreements to
which such Parties are party." The same national treatment princi-
ples apply:
Each Party shall accord national treatment to the goods of another Party in
accordance with Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and its interpretative notes, and to this end Article III of
the GATT and its interpretative notes, or any equivalent provision of a
successor agreement to which all Parties are party, are incorporated into
and made part of this Agreement.
6
5
The general GATT requirements are incorporated by reference
into the NAFTA chapter on trade in petroleum products,6 and in the
NAFTA safeguards chapter (Chapter 8), "[e]ach Party retains its
rights and obligations under Article XIX of the GATT or any safe-
guard agreement pursuant thereto." 67 The NAFTA also contains lan-
guage incorporating GATT Article XI, barring prohibitions and re-
strictions on imports, exports or sales of goods, by reference,"s and
the general exceptions in GATT Article XX. 9 Certain agricultural
domestic support programs are subject to GATT disciplines, "' and
GATT obligations regarding technical barriers to trade are reaffirmed
but not incorporated by reference in the NAFTA's standards (Chap-
ter 9).7
Furthermore, the subject matter overlap between the NAFTA and
the WTO is extensive. Both agreements contain, inter alia, provi-
sions governing agricultural trade; safeguards; sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures; technical barriers to trade; trade in textiles and
64. Id. art. 103.1.
65. Id. art. 301.1.
66. See id. art. 603.1.
67. Id. art. 802.1.
68. See NAFTA supra note 1, art. 309.1.
69. See id. art. 2101.1.
70. See id. art. 704.
71. See id. art. 903.
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clothing; trade in services; and investment measures. The NAFTA
also incorporates by reference the general exceptions to the GATT,72
and each agreement has a "national security" exception utilizing
identical language. 3
Given the combination of the subject matter breadth of the
NAFTA, the broad jurisdictional scope of Chapter 20, and the
wholesale incorporation of GATT/WTO provisions into the NAFTA
by reference, it is almost inevitable that the Chapter 20 dispute set-
tlement mechanism will from time to time be required to deal with
GATT/WTO legal issues as well as those arising exclusively under
the NAFTA. It is also possible that a WTO dispute panel will be re-
quired on occasion to decide peripheral NAFTA issues relevant to
the matter before the panel.
The financial services provisions of the NAFTA-relating chiefly
to banking, insurance, and brokerage 7-incorporate a variation of
Chapter 20 for dispute resolution. The Chapter 20 procedures apply,
so that only governments may bring actions. However, the panelists
are to be chosen from a special roster of financial services experts."
C. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 20
The NAFTA creates a "Free Trade Commission" composed of the
trade ministers of the three NAFTA governments, who have the re-
sponsibility of overseeing the implementation of the agreement and
resolving disputes. 76 The Agreement also creates a NAFTA secretar-
iat with national sections to provide assistance to the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission and to the panels established under Chapters 19
and 20 . These national sections are tasked with a variety of func-
72. See id. art. 2101 (incorporating GATT Article XX).
73. See id. art. 2102; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art.
XXI, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotia-
tions, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter GATT 1994], reprinted in I HANDBOOK OF
WTO/GATT SETTLEMENT (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds., 1998).
74. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 14.
75. See id. art. 1414.2.
76. See id. art. 2001. The Commission may respond to questions from national
judicial or administrative proceedings regarding the interpretation or application of
the NAFTA that are referred to the Commission. See id. art. 2001.1.
77. See id. art. 2002.3.
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tions: (a) administering the budget of the dispute settlement process;
(b) supervising the appointment and maintenance of panel members,
including the code of conduct and conflicts of interest; (c) providing
case management directly, including the holding of panel meetings
and hearings, and assistance in the issuance of orders and decisions;
(d) receiving, administering and safeguarding confidential informa-
tion furnished by the governments; and (e) acting as liaison with the
national administering authorities in Chapter 19 proceedings.7'
As with many other international dispute settlement procedures,
the NAFTA mechanism is a three-step process. The process begins
with a request for consultations: "[t]he consulting Parties shall make
every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any
matter through consultations under this Article or other consultative
provisions of this Agreement." "' If consultation fails to resolve the
dispute within a stated time period, usually within thirty days of the
request, the complaining Party may seek good offices, conciliation,
or mediation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission." Thirty days
later, or after "such other period as the consulting Parties may
agree," either Party may request the convening of an arbitral panel."
Once a Party has initiated dispute settlement under Chapter 20, it is
precluded from seeking parallel action under the WTO." However,
this prohibition only applies once Commission action is requested; a
request for NAFTA consultations does not preclude a parallel request
before the WTO, as NAFTA dispute settlement procedures are con-
78. See id. arts. 1904, 2002. In the author's experience with the Chapter 19 bi-
national panel process-which is managed by the same national secretariats---each
of the three sections of the NAFTA secretariat has been proven to be well-
managed and efficient despite a variety of challenges not necessarily contemplated
by the drafters of the agreement. Significantly, these sections do not exercise
authority independently of the member governments. Therefore, they have no legal
power to require the governments to comply with time limits specified for the ap-
pointment of arbitral panels, or with other procedural requirements.
79. Id. art. 2006.5.
80. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2007. 1.
81. See id. art. 2008.1.
82. See id. art. 2005.6. The reverse is true, except where in the course of a
WTO dispute settlement an issue is raised under the NAFTA that is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Chapter 20. See id. arts. 2007.3, 2007.4, 2007.6.
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sidered initiated when recourse is made to the Free Trade Commis-
sion under Article 2007. "
The arbitral panel process contemplates the use of a standing ros-
ter limited to thirty persons designated by the NAFTA Parties, with
experience in "law, international trade, other matters covered by this
Agreement or the resolution of disputes arising under international
trade agreements" who are independent of the governments and
comply with an applicable code of conduct.84 Thus, the panelists need
not be lawyers, and presumably, the "independent of the govern-
ments" requirement means that they cannot be government employ-
ees.85 Where there are no more than two disputing Parties, a group of
five arbitrators will be chosen, normally from the roster.86 Interest-
ingly, in a unique "reverse selection process," one Party chooses the
two national arbitrators of the other Party. For example, in the Dairy
Product Export Subsidies case, 7 the United States selected the two
Canadian panelists from a list of candidates offered by Canada, and
Canada selected the American panelists from a list of candidates of-
fered by the United States. 8 The two governments choose the chair-
person of the panel by agreement; if there is no agreement, a Party
chosen by lot selects the chair of the panel, who may not be a citizen
of the disputing Parties. 9 Thus, in the normally contemplated situa-
tion-and in fact in the two cases that have reached arbitration under
Chapter 20-the panels consist of two nationals from each of the
disputing Parties, and a chairperson from a neutral country. Where
all three NAFTA Parties are involved in the proceeding, the chair-
person will be chosen in the same manner, but the Party complained
83. See id. arts. 2005.6, 2007.
84. Id. art. 2009.2(a).
85. Id. art. 2009.2(b).
86. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2011.1, 2011.3. As of March 1999, the
roster members had not been formally designated by the three governments.
87. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Dairy Product Export Subsidies case
pertaining to measures affecting the importation of milk and the exportation of
dairy products).
88. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2011.1(c) (providing that "within 15 days
of the selection of the chair, each disputing Party shall select two panelists who are
citizens of the other disputing party").
89. See id. art. 2011.1(b).
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against chooses two panelists, one national each from the complain-
ing Parties, and the complaining Parties will choose two panelists
who are nationals of the party complained against"
Despite the flexible criteria for panelists, eight of the ten panelists
who have served on the two cases under Chapter 20 to date have
been law professors. 9' Of the remaining two panelists, one is an at-
torney, while the other is a non-lawyer government official.
The Rules of Procedure for Chapter 20 Panels92 generally contain
few major innovations. The panel process contemplates written sub-
missions and one or more hearings.9' The NAFTA gives the Parties
or the panels wide latitude in seeking information and technical ad-
vice from experts,9' and provides for the use of scientific review
boards in "environmental, health, safety or other scientific matters
raised by a disputing Party."95 However, there is no right for anyone
other than the Parties to participate in the proceedings. Provision is
also made for translation and interpretation of submissions and ar-
gument in the event that more than one language is used during the
proceedings. 96
90. See id. art. 2011.2.
91. See In re Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural
Products, CDA-95-2008-01, Report of the Panel (Dec. 2, 1996), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, [hereinafter NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural
Products Tariffication] (appointing American law professors Sidney Picker, Jr. and
Stephen Zamora, Canadian professors Ronald C.C. Cuming and Donald M.
McRae, and British professor Elihu Lauterpacht to the binational review panel);
infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the case); see also In re U.S. Safeguard Action Taken
on Broom Corn Brooms from Mexico, USA-97-2008-01, Report of the Panel (Jan.
30, 1988) [hereinafter NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Brooms]; infra Part II.A.8
(discussing the case). In this case, the panelists were American law professors John
H. Barton and Robert H. Hudec, Mexican law professor and attorney Dionisio
Kaye, Mexican attorney Raymundo Enriquez, and a non-lawvyer Australian gov-
ernment official, Paul O'Connor. See id. at 29.
92. See Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter 20 Panels, reprinted in 2
HOLBEIN & MUSCH, supra note 17, BOOKLET A- 10 [hereinafter Model Rules].
93. See id. paras. 6-13, 21-29.
94. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2014.
95. Id. arts. 2014-15.
96. See Model Rules, supra note 92, paras. 49-56.
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The NAFTA contemplates that the panels will provide the Parties
with an initial report, findings of fact, a determination of the legal is-
sues, and recommendations for resolution of the issues in dispute."7
Parties may submit written comments on the initial report within
fourteen days.9 A final report shall issue thirty days later, unless the
Parties agree otherwise. 99 The decision of the panel is not automati-
cally applicable to resolve the dispute. Rather, once the decision is
rendered, the "disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the
dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and
recommendations of the panel."' ° Thus, some scholars characterize
the panel determination as being more in the nature of a recommen-
dation to the affected governments and implicitly criticize the deter-
mination for playing only a "facilitating role" that falls "short of
authoritatively resolving the dispute."'' ° Others describe the panel
mechanism as a "political troubleshooting institution rather than as
an independent arbitral body."' '°
The above characterizations are at minimum misleading. In fact,
failure of the Parties to implement the arbitral report may result in
prompt and serious consequences. If the report is not implemented or
another mutually satisfactory resolution is not reached within thirty
days of receipt of the final report, the complaining Party may retali-
ate, by suspending "the application to the Party complained against
of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as they [the Parties]
have reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute."' 3 However,
the panel determinations are non-binding in the sense that they have
97. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2016.
98. See id. art. 2016.4.
99. Seeid. art. 2017.1.
100. Id. art. 2018.1.
101. See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Decision Making and Dispute Resolution in the
Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Essay on Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
357, 379 (1997) (discussing criticisms of the NAFTA Panel's role as an arbitral
body).
102. Huntington, supra note 22, at 416 (discussing the design of the Canada-
United States Free Trade Commission).
103. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019.1. If the suspension of trade benefits is
considered "manifestly excessive" by the Party against which retaliation is made,
that Party may request the establishment of a panel to review the issue. See id. art.
2019.3.
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no direct effect on United States law, and neither federal or state
governments are bound by findings or recommendations.'0'
There is no provision for appeal of the Chapter 20 panel decisions,
although use of the initial report/final report process provides the
Parties with an opportunity to urge a reconsideration of determina-
tions made in the initial report. Nor is there any process, other than
continuing diplomatic negotiations and the threat of retaliation, to as-
sure that any agreed resolution of the issues is faithfully imple-
mented.
The Chapter 20 panel process is intended to remain confidential
between the Parties, reflecting an almost obsessive concern for se-
crecy on the part of the governments. Thus, the Rules of Procedure
must and do provide that "the panel's hearings, deliberations, and
initial report, and all written submissions to and communications
with the panel shall be confidential."'0' In fact, in the initial proceed-
ing under Chapter 20, panelists were instructed that "[t]he names of
the panel members are not public until the final report is published
by the Parties."' ' Apparently, the confidentiality is meant to protect
panelists from "harassing inquiries" during the proceedings; how-
ever, the efforts-largely unsuccessful-to enforce such confidenti-
ality may create a "Star Chamber" quality.""?
The existence of the Chapter 20 mechanism and a permanent
NAFTA secretariat offers the NAFTA Parties the opportunity to use
selected aspects of the Chapter 20 structure for ad hoe arbitrations.
For example, in the 1996 Softvood Lumber Agreement,"' the gov-
ernments of Canada and the United States provided a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that incorporates significant features of the Chapter
20 process, including cross-selection of national panelists by the
104. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 17, at 195; see also
LEON E. TRAKMAN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NAFTA 18-19 (1996).
105. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2012.1(b); see also Model Rules, supra note 92,
para. 35.
106. Sidney Picker, Jr., NAFTA Chapter Twenty-Reflections on Party-to-Parqy
Dispute Resolution, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMPI. L. 465, 469 n.35 (quoting a Jan.
19, 1996, letter from Cathy Beehan, Canadian NAFTA Secretary, to Panelist Sid-
ney Picker).
107. See id. at 469.
108. See supra note 55 (describing the Softvood Lumber Agreement).
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other government.'c9 In the only case initiated under the Softwood
Lumber Agreement to date, brought by the United States against
Canada, the Canadian section of the NAFTA Secretariat is acting as
the Secretariat for the ad hoc arbitration, and it appears likely that it
will follow many of the NAFTA Chapter 20 procedures."
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF NAFTA CHAPTER 19
While the only NAFTA mechanism for resolving "govemment-to-
government" disputes generally is Chapter 20, the Chapter 19 dispute
settlement mechanism is also relevant because of its subject matter-
antidumping and subsidies disputes under national legislation.'"
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, like Chapter 19 of the CFTA, provides a
unique arbitral mechanism designed primarily for private "interested
parties" to seek binational panel review of decisions of the adminis-
trative agencies of the three countries in antidumping and counter-
vailing duty cases.112
Chapter 19, however, provides only a very narrow basis for gov-
ernment-to-government dispute settlement. Each NAFTA Party un-
der Chapter 19 retains the right to modify its trade laws, subject to
certain notice provisions, and the obvious requirement that national
laws remain consistent with the GATT, including any successor
agreements such as the Uruguay Round Antidumping and Subsidies
Agreements relating to the subject."3 Each NAFTA Party also has the
right to seek review of changes in national law by another NAFTA
109. See Softwood Lumber Agreement, supra note 55, art. V, paras. 4, 6-9 (re-
ferring to the rules governing the appointment of an arbitral panel).
110. See U.S., Canada Agree on Final Panelist for Lumber Arbitration, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Dec. 4, 1998, at 12 (reporting that Professor Maureen Irish of Canada,
David A. Gantz of the United States, and Michael Cartland of Hong Kong-as
Chairman-would be the panelists).
111. See David A. Gantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA 's Chap-
ter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process to Mexico, 29 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 297, 298 (1998) (providing a more extensive discussion of
Chapter 19).
112. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1901.1 (stating the scope of Article 1904).
Cases relating to United States, Canadian, or Mexican customs service rulings on
classification, valuation, and origin of merchandise, are not subject to panel re-
view. See id.
113. See id. art. 1902.1.
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Party that are alleged to be inconsistent with the NAFTA or with
provisions of the GATT or WTO agreements."' The inconsistency
issue may be resolved solely by a distinct binational panel process
under Chapter 19, not Chapter 20, in a government-to-government
action that is controlled by intemational trade law rather than na-
tional law provisions."' These particular Chapter 19 provisions do
not, however, apply to existing national laws; alleged inconsistencies
of such laws with GATTIWTO provisions are subject only to WTO
DSB jurisdiction, as discussed earlier. The government-to-
government provisions of Chapter 19 have not been invoked as of
March 1999.
Because of the subject matter, actions relating to antidumping and
countervailing duty actions may be brought both under NAFTA
Chapter 19 and the WTO's DSU. Yet, although overlapping, these
are not really parallel mechanisms; they serve different purposes and
are available to different litigants. Chapter 19 is open only to private
parties seeking review of national administrative determinations un-
der national law, in lieu of recourse to local courts, while the WTO
mechanism is restricted to governments seeking to challenge national
law or determinations that are in conflict with the WTO agree-
ments.1
6
The principal motivation for Chapter 19 of the CFTA, on which
NAFTA Chapter 19 is based, appears to have been the refusal of the
United States to provide Canada with an exemption from United
States antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Specifically, the
United States agreed to the process as part of a "compromise" in
which Canada temporarily abandoned its demand for special trade
remedy laws to be applicable in the United States and Canada.'"7 The
114. See id. arts. 1902.2, 1903.
115. See id. art. 1903, Annex 1903.2.
116. See generally Robert Howse, Settling Trade Remedy Disputes: When the
WTO Forun is Better than NAFTA, 111 C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE COMMENTARY
(1998). Canadian attorney Robert Howse criticizes the Chapter 19 process as inef-
fective with regard to politically-sensitive trade remedy disputes. See id. However,
Howse erroneously appears to assume that Chapter 19 and the VTO Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding provide alternative fora in which Canada may seek to re-
solve antidumping and countervailing duty disputes with the United States. See id.
at 15.
117. See Brief for Intervenor the Government of Canada at 4, American Coali-
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NAFTA Parties essentially adopted the same mechanism-but with-
out the "temporary" aspect-when in the course of the NAFTA ne-
gotiations the United States again refused to incorporate special trade
remedy provisions for its NAFTA partners." 8
Under NAFTA Chapter 19, each Party's substantive antidumping
and countervailing duty laws continue to be applied, in accordance
with the applicable statutes, legislative history, regulations, adminis-
trative practice, and judicial decisions. The Chapter 19 panels re-
viewing national administrative decisions are not international tribu-
nals except in the sense that they are binational. The panels do not
directly apply international law-provisions of the NAFTA, GATT
Articles VI or XVI, or the provisions of the WTO Antidumping and
Subsidies Agreements-except to the extent these international trade
rules are considered part of the applicable national law. 20 Chapter 19
thus effectively substitutes a binational panel process for the federal
courts of each party through which appeals from the administrative
agencies are referred to five-person arbitral panels of trade experts
who are nationals of the two countries whose citizens are involved in
antidumping or countervailing duty actions.' The panels' powers are
tion for Competitive Trade v. United States, 128 F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No.
97-1036); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO/GGD-95-175BR,
U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
CONTROVERSY IN APPEALS OF TRADE REMEDY CASES TO BINATIONAL PANELS 15
(1995) [hereinafter GAO Report]. Undoubtedly, Canada considered the costs and
delays of the appellate process in antidumping and countervailing duty appeals to
United States courts, and the perception of these courts as being overly deferential
to the determinations of the Department of Commerce and the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission, while negotiating the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement. See GAO Report, supra, at 15. In particular, these considera-
tions prompted Canadian negotiators to seek the special appellate process that re-
moved such appeals from the jurisdiction of the federal courts of the United States
and Canada. See id. (stating that "a major Canadian objective in the negotiations
was to devise a new approach to replace these trade remedy laws").
118. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1904.15 (providing Mexico's schedule
for implementation of the major procedural reforms in its domestic antidumping
and countervailing duty laws).
119. See id. art. 1902.1.
120. Panel procedures are primarily governed by international rules and the Ar-
ticle 1904 Rules of Procedure; however, national law fills gaps where the Rules do
not apply. See North American Free Trade Agreement Rules of Procedure for Arti-
cle 1904 Binational Reviews, 59 Fed. Reg. 8,686, 8,686 (1994).
121. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2(1). The binational panelists
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not co-equal with those of the federal courts. For example, a NAFTA
panel may "uphold a final determination [of dumping or subsidies] or
remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision."'-" It
has no authority to reverse or dismiss an agency determination.' :
There is no appeal of a panel decision except where there is an al-
legation of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest,
where the panel decision departs from a fundamental rule of proce-
dure, or where the panel exceeds its power, authority, or jurisdic-
tion-including, significantly, and in a change from the CFTA, fail-
ure to apply the proper standard of review-and such actions
materially affected the decision.'24 In such instances alone, an "ex-
traordinary challenge procedure" or appeal is permitted to a special
three person review panel for decision.'2"
The very existence of the Chapter 19 panel process has become
controversial in the United States. Some criticize the placement of
decision-making power in the hands of individuals, including foreign
nationals, who lack judicial experience, who are not accountable for
their performance, who have not been appointed in accordance with
Article III of the United States Constitution, and who may disregard
themselves are selected from standing rosters of at least twenty-five individuals
designated by each of the NAFTA member states. See id. Furthermore, "candidates
shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and shall be chosen strictly on
the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity with
international trade law." Id. Preference under the NAFTA is to be given to judges
and former judges; however, no American judge or former judge has yet served on
a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel, although at least one Canadian judge has been desig-
nated. See Telephone Interview with Cathy Beehan, Esq., Canadian NAFTA Sec-
retary (Oct. 27, 1997) (transcript on file with the author). Panelists are normally
trade practitioners or law professors serving on an ad hoc, part-time basis, and paid
a very modest compensation-four hundred Canadian dollars per day as of the end
of March 1999. See id. Since many are simultaneously practicing before the na-
tional trade agencies at the same time as they are serving as panelists, the risk of
actual or apparent conflicts of interest is high, even though panelists are subject to
a detailed code of conduct at the time of appointment and throughout their service
as panelists. See Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures Under Chap-
ters Nineteen and Twenty of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 59 Fed.
Reg. 8,721, 8,722 (1994).
122. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904.8.
123. See id.
124. See id. art. 1904.13.
125. Id. Annex 1904.13.
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the requirement that they behave like local courts and apply United
States law.'26 Furthermore, there have been constitutional challenges
against the panel process.' 7 The absence of similar challenges to
Chapter 20 may be due to the greater comfort level that many poten-
tial critics have with the concept of international arbitrators deciding
questions of international-NAFTA or WTO-law, in a context
where there is no alternative national court jurisdiction.
Appeals of administrative determinations in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases disputes are the most common of those
filed under NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms, which is not
surprising since the United States, Canada, and Mexico remain
among the most frequent users of the antidumping laws. As of Janu-
ary 12, 1999, the countries filed a total of forty-four requests for re-
126. See Joint Hearings on Extension of Fast Track Negotiating Authority Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. I -
2 (1995) (statement of AK Steel Company, et al.) (opposing Fast-Track Procedures
for Trade Agreements Containing the NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel Dis-
pute System). Opposition appears to be directed at problems encountered with a
few well-publicized cases concerning softwood lumber, pork, and live swine,
rather than the bulk of Chapter 19 cases that have resulted in unanimous and/or
non-controversial decisions. See GAO Report, supra note 117, at 68 (listing the
value of the imports involved in these three cases). Thus, in a study of fifteen cases
challenging the determinations of the Department of Commerce and the United
States International Trade Commission, only five-including those concerning live
swine and softwood lumber-were not unanimous, and in only one did the panel-
ists divide along nationality lines. See id. at 100-01.
127. See Harry B. Endsley, Dispute Settlement Under the CFTA and NAFTA:
From Eleventh-Hour Innovation to Accepted Institution, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 659, 671-72 (1995) (discussing congressional concerns before the
implementation of the CFTA). Plaintiffs have argued, inter alia, that the appoint-
ment of panelists without the advice and consent of the Senate is a violation of the
"appointments" clause of the United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2(2),
and that the removal of jurisdiction of the federal courts in favor of panels violates
Article III, Section 1. See NAFTA: Group Files Constitutional Challenge to
NAFTA, Binational Panel System, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) 671-72 (Jan. 17,
1997), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (discussing the filing of a complaint by
the American Coalition for Competitive Trade). All constitutional challenges to the
Chapter 19 panel process to date have been dismissed for lack of standing or with-
drawn. See, e.g., American Coalition for Competitive Trade v. United States, 128
F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997). An action has also been filed challenging the NAFTA
as a whole based on the fact that it was concluded as an executive agreement with
Congressional approval rather than as a treaty. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jul. 17,
1998, at 1, 21
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view under the Chapter 19 mechanism.'2' Only one Chapter 19 matter
to date has been subject to a parallel or subsequent proceeding before
the WTO, although governments filed early WTO consultation re-
quests with regard to Mexican tomatoes and American high fructose
corn syrup. At this writing, the latter case is subject to both Chapter
19 adjudication and a request for WTO dispute settlement, and re-
lated issues-not directly involving Mexican antidumping laws-are
before NAFTA Chapter 20 panels for consultations.'-9
E. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WTO
Certain scholars have criticized the pre-1995 GATT dispute set-
tlement's endless delays and political biases.'" Under the consensus
rules then in effect, a single GATT contracting party, including the
offending party, could unilaterally block the adoption of panel re-
ports indefinitely and thereby forestall remedial action. The WTO's
DSU is intended to resolve most of these problems.'"' In particular,
panel decisions are adopted automatically unless there is consensus
against their adoption-including the prevailing party.'
128. See NAFTA Secretariat, NAFTA Secretariat Status Report of Active and
Completed NAFTA Panels (Jan. 12, 1999) [hereinafter NAFT4 Secretariat Status
Report]. The forty-four requests include actions terminated by request of the inter-
ested parties before a decision was rendered, matters in which panel decisions have
been rendered, but because of remands or other factors the cases have not been
completed, matters under suspension pending completion of panel selection, and
completed matters through decisions and compliance by Parties. Id.
129. See infra Parts II.A.9 and II.B.4 (discussing restrictions on sugar and high
fructose corn sugar).
130. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 99; see also BHALA & KENNEDY, supra
note 28, at 26 (discussing dispute settlement in the pre-1995 GATT system).
131. For a comprehensive analysis of the first three years of WTO dispute reso-
lution, see Timothy M. Reif & John R. Magnus, Synposiuin on the First Three
Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 32 INT'L L. 609 (1998) (detailing the
symposium in reference to early operations of the DSU of the WTO). See also
SPECIAL ISSUE: WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 175-
327 (1998).
132. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 39 (discussing the adoption of
Panel and Appellate Body reports). While the two commentators have asserted that
"the DSU guarantees the winning Member the fruits of its victory, even if all other
WTO members object to the [panel] report," post-decision implementation remains
less certain. See id.; see also infra notes 161-176 and accompanying text (detailing
DSU WTO Appellate Body review and enforcement).
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The NAFTA Chapter 20 and WTO DSU provide similar mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution, but the process differs in significant re-
spects, particularly in execution. The WTO process is managed by
the DSB, constituting the full membership of the WTO,"' and ad-
ministered by the WTO Secretariat in Geneva.14 While NAFTA in-
corporates a Free Trade Commission and a secretariat that on paper
appear similar to the DSB and WTO Secretariat, both are creatures of
the disputing parties when they are administering dispute settlement
procedures. At least two members of the NAFTA Free Trade Com-
mission are necessarily officials of the governments that are parties
to a NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute.'35 In contrast, only two or a few
WTO Members are parties to any single dispute under the WTO. Be-
cause the vast majority of the members of the DSB are not involved
in the matter, they should be more or less impartial implementers of
the dispute settlement process. Consequently, the existence of the in-
dependent DSB and the Secretariat appears somewhat more likely to
assure the proper application and enforcement of the DSU's strict
time limits.
As in the NAFTA, the DSU process begins with mandatory con-
sultations.3 6 If the WTO Member against which the request is made
refuses to enter into consultations, or the consultations do not resolve
the issue within sixty days of the request, the complaining Member
may request the establishment of a panel.'37 Good offices, concilia-
tion, and mediation through the person of the WTO Secretary Gen-
eral are available to the disputing Members, on a totally voluntary
basis, and may continue even during the panel process. 8 Otherwise,
133. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 2.1 (providing a brief history of the dispute set-
tlement body).
134. See id. art. 27 (listing the responsibilities of the Secretariat).
135. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2001.1 (stating that the Free Trade Commis-
sion consists of the trade ministers of the three NAFTA governments).
136. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 4 (setting forth the procedures for consulta-
tions).
137. See id. art. 4.7 (explaining that the request may be made in less than sixty
days if both Members agree, or in the event or urgency, including but not limited
to perishable goods).
138. See id. art. 5.
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the panel is automatically established no later than sixty days after
the request for a panel is made. 3
Once the complaining Member insists on the establishment of a
panel, the remaining dispute settlement process is subject to a strict
timetable, with a limit of nine months for completion of the process
or twelve months if there is an appeal.'" Only if all disputing Mem-
bers agree can the process be delayed.' 1 Moreover, the selection of
panelists is largely automatic as well, eliminating another potential
source of delay.
Essentially, the composition of the panel should be as follows:
[The panel should] be composed of well-qualified governmental and non-
governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or pre-
sented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a
contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or
Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in
the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member. "*
Panelists should be independent of the Members, and should re-
flect a diverse background with a wide range of experiences. Fur-
thermore, the panelists need not have legal training or experience.
Citizens of the disputing Members may not serve on panels in dis-
putes in which their governments are parties, unless the disputing
Members agree otherwise. 43 The Secretariat maintains a roster of
potential panelists nominated by the WTO Member governments,
and as of the end of 1996, the roster contained approximately 200
names.'" As under the NAFTA, panelists serving in the WTO are
subject to a code of conduct, designed to assure impartiality and
139. See id. art. 6.1 (stating that the Member against whom a complaint is
lodged can object to the establishment of a panel at the first monthly meeting of
the Dispute Settlement Body). The panel, however, will automatically be estab-
lished at preceding monthly meeting of the DSB. See id.
140. See id. art. 20.
141. See id.
142. DSU, supra note 2, art. 8.1.
143. See id. arts. 8.2, 8.3.
144. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 32.
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avoid conflicts of interest.145 Unless otherwise agreed, WTO panels
consist of three persons.1
46
The WTO procedures also contemplate a formal legal process,
with briefing, a hearing, supplementary written submissions in ap-
propriate circumstances, and written determinations. 47 The panel has
broad discretion to "seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body which it deems appropriate,"' 48 subject to a re-
quirement to advise the Member when the individual or body is
within the jurisdiction of the Member. The panel may seek an advi-
sory report from an expert review group where "a factual issue con-
cerning an scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a
dispute" is at issue.' 49 While there is no explicit right in the DSU it-
self permitting a disputing Member to provide expert testimony,
there are no provisions that would preclude incorporating such in-
formation in the written filings of the Member before the panel, and
the Appellate Body has explicitly ruled that briefs of non-
governmental organizations appended to the briefs of the parties are
to be treated by panels as part of the parties' submissions.5
Also, as with NAFTA Chapter 20, the deliberations of a WTO
panel are confidential, and any opinions expressed by individual
panel reports are anonymous.'' Information provided to a panel by
experts remains confidential unless the submitter has formally
authorized its release.1 2 Although the DSU does not appear to require
closed proceedings, the entire panel process remains closed to the
public, including the briefs, hearings, and panel report until deemed
145. See Rules of Conduct for Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-
ing the Settlement of Disputes, 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DSB/RC/l, art. IV, An-
nex la, lb.
146. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 8.5 (stating that the Members may agree, up to
ten days before the establishment of the panel, to a panel consisting of five people).
147. See id. art. 12.
148. Id. art. 13.1.
149. Id. art. 13.2.
150. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, Oct. 12, 1998, WTO Doc. No.WT/DS58/AB/R, at 30-31 (admitting briefs
that were attached to party submissions).
151. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 14.
152. See id. art. 13.1.
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final. Controversy has arisen in some instances because lawyer-
consultants retained by some Members to assist with litigation before
panels have not been permitted to attend the hearings.'" Unfortu-
nately, the United States government supports this exclusionary pro-
cess1- However, the United States has taken the lead in advocating
for a more transparent and open system. In a pending case relating to
a dispute over Canada's dairy product import restrictions, the United
States has argued unsuccessfully that the United States and Canada
should set a favorable precedent by opening the proceedings to in-
dustry observers.155 The United States has also called for the discus-
sion of a more open system when the WTO's review of the DSU
takes place in 1999. '56
The DSU requires the panel to circulate the factual and argument
sections of its report to the disputing Members, obtain comments,
and then circulate an interim report-including the panel's findings
and conclusions-to the Members for comment." The panel may
hold an additional hearing on the issues raised, if a Member so re-
quests."' The final report, reflecting any Member comments on the
153. See Steger & Hainsworth, supra note 24, at 220. Cf VTO Appellate Body
Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas, Sept. 9, 1997, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS27/ABIR [hereinafter VTO
Appellate Body Report on Bananas] (permitting a private legal adviser to the Gov-
ernment of St. Lucia to participate in the hearing). This particular aspect of the
penchant for confidentiality is troubling for smaller member nations, who lacking
sufficient international trade expertise within their governments may be required to
seek outside legal assistance.
154. See Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in IVTO Dispute Resolution, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1206-07 (1998) (stating that staff law yers at the Office of
the United States Trade Representative agree that private attorneys should not be
permitted to attend panel hearings, not to mention present arguments).
155. See Canada: Canada Says No to USTR Request for Industry Observers at
WTO Talks, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 9, 1998), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library (reporting that Canada rejected a proposal by the United States to
allow industry observers to attend negotiations).
156. See Preliminary Views of the United States Regarding Review of the DSU,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 6, 1998, at 9, 10 (stating the government's position that
"the secrecy of submission fuels public suspicion of the dispute settlement process
and undermines confidence in the WVTO").
157. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 15.
158. See id. art. 15.2 (explaining that a party has the possibility, within a certain
period of time, to submit a written request for the panel to review specific areas of
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interim report, is then circulated to the DSB members. It is adopted
automatically within sixty days unless the DSB rejects the report by
consensus,59 or unless an appeal is lodged by one of the disputing
Members. This is in contrast to the earlier process under GATT Arti-
cle XXIII, where any member government, including the government
losing the panel decision, could unilaterally block adoption of the
panel report."6
Unlike NAFTA Chapters 20 and 19, and most other international
arbitral procedures, the DSU provides an appellate level of review.
The "Appellate Body" reviews panel decisions upon the request of
any disputing Member. 6' Specifically, it is authorized to conduct a
review of the initial panel decision, "limited to issues of law covered
in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel.'62 The Appellate Body is composed of seven members, three
of whom are chosen to sit on each appeal, on a rotating basis.'6
Members of the Body serve four-year terms, with the possibility of
reappointment for an additional term.64 Basically, the Members are
to be "persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise
in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered
agreements generally."' 65 Proceedings before the Appellate Body are
swift; they are normally completed in sixty days, with the possibility
the interim report before a final report is circulated to all Members).
159. See id. art. 16.4 (setting forth how a report is adopted or rejected).
160. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 38-39 (delineating the old pro-
cedures for the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports).
161. DSU, supra note 2, art. 17.
162. Id. art. 17.6.
163. See id. art. 17.
164. See id. art. 17.2. The initial seven members of the Appellate Body-nation-
als of the United States, Japan, Germany, Egypt, Uruguay, and the Philippines-
reflect the directive that "the Appellate Body membership shall be broadly repre-
sentative of membership in the WTO." Id. art. 17.3. Generally, the members of the
Body receive an appointment for four-year terms, except three original members
received an initial appointment of only two-year terms. See OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REP., 1998 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 67
(1998), available in <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/tpa/1998/contents.html>. Subse-
quently, the DSB re-appointed these three members to new four-year terms. See id.
165. DSU, supra note 2, art. 17.3.
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of a maximum extension of ninety days.' Although adoption of the
panel report by the DSB is stayed pending appellate review, the out-
come of the appellate review is automatically adopted within thirty
days of its circulation to the Members.' 7
When the panel or Appellate Body determines that an action of a
Member is inconsistent with one of the covered trade agreements, it
recommends to the non-complying Member that it bring its actions
into compliance and provides suggestions as to how that may oc-
cur.161 Once the report is adopted by the DSB, the preferred result of
the process is for the Member to eliminate its violation of the af-
fected agreement, often by altering its national law or regulations,
within a reasonable period of time; the Member has thirty days to
advise the DSB whether it will comply.'" Practice to date indicates
that a "reasonable period of time" is frequently considered to be fif-
teen months-even where arguments could be made for a shorter
compliance period."" If the Parties cannot agree upon a "reasonable
period of time," an arbitrator appointed by the Members or by the
Secretary-General may determine the timetable."' As the United
166. See id. art. 17.5 (stating the general rule regarding the duration of Appellate
Body proceedings).
167. See id. art. 17.14 (delineating the adoption procedure).
168. See id. art. 19.
169. See id. art. 21 (discussing the surveillance of the implementation of rec-
ommendations and rulings of the DSB).
170. See Preliininai, Views of the United States Regarding Review of the DSU,
supra note 156, at 9 (stating the United States argument that "the negotiators of the
DSU never intended that the period [for compliance with decisions) automatically
be 15 months").
171. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.3(c) (stating that a guide "should be that the
reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations
should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate
Body report," with the caveat that "the time may be shorter or longer, depending
upon the particular circumstances"). In three of the four cases in which an arbitra-
tor has been appointed under Article 21.3(c) to determine time for compliance with
a WTO decision, the arbitrator determined that there were no "particular circum-
stances" that justified a departure from the fifteen-month guideline. See European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), May
29, 1998, WTO Doe. No. WT/DS48/13 (Lacarte-Muro, Arb.); European Commu-
nities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Jan. 7, 1998,
WTO Doe. No. WT/DS27/15 (EI-Naggar, Arb.); WTO Appellate Body Report on
Bananas, supra note 153; Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. Feb. 14, 1997,
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States government has carefully advised Congress, however, no
Member is required as a result of an adopted panel or appellate report
to change its laws or regulations.'72
If the Member found to be violating a covered trade agreement
does not comply with the DSB's decision within a reasonable period
of time, it may be required to enter into consultations "with a view to
developing mutually acceptable compensation."" If a satisfactory
arrangement on compensation is not reached within twenty days, the
injured Member or Members may seek authorization from the DSB
to retaliate against the violating Member by suspending tariff con-
cessions or other obligations under the covered agreements, subject
to certain guidelines and restrictions.'74 It is obvious from the lan-
guage of the DSU, however, that the objective of the system is to
eliminate Member actions that violate the covered agreements, rather
than assure compensation for the resulting injuries.'
Interestingly, the DSU fails to provide Members who settle their
disputes without resort to arbitration the same mechanisms to assure
that the settlement results are implemented. Rather, it leaves to the
affected Members the responsibility of implementing settlement
agreements; the injured Member may of course insist on formal DSU
arbitration, but this is likely to occur only after significant delays.'
76
WTO Doc. Nos. WT/DSIO/15, WT/DSI1/13, (Lacarte-Muro, Arb.) [hereinafter
WTO Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages]. However, in the fourth case, the ar-
bitrator indicated that under normal circumstances Indonesia should have been able
to change its laws to comply with the WTO decision within six months, but per-
mitted an additional six months for compliance due to Indonesia's status as a de-
veloping nation and its current financial crisis, for a total of twelve months. See
Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Dec. 7, 1998,
WTO Doc. Nos. WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12 (Beeby, Arb.).
172. See The Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Statement of Administrative
Action, Pub. L. No. 103-465, at 1008-09, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040,
4300.
173. DSU, supra note 2, art. 22.2.
174. See id. arts. 22.2, 22.3 (stating that the process that must be followed for
compensation and the suspension of concessions).
175. See id. art. 22.1 (setting forth that "[n]either compensation nor the suspen-
sion of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agree-
ments").
176. See Shoyer, supra note 26, at 287.
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II. EXPERIENCE UNDER NAFTA AND THE WTO
The actual jurisprudence created by NAFTA Chapter 20 and the
WTO involving NAFTA parties in disputes against each other has
been limited. There have been only two panel decisions under
NAFTA Chapter 20 to date, and one decision at the WTO involving
NAFTA Parties. However, there have been a total of eleven requests
for consultation under the NAFTA mechanism and five under the
WTO, a number of which remain pending as of January 31, 1999.'"
In at least four of the nine Chapter 20 requests-Restrictions on
Sugar, Safeguards on Brooms, Uranium Exports, and the Helms-
Burton Act-the Parties were required to decide on the most appro-
priate forum, and in each instance appear to have analyzed carefully
the relevant factors. This history thus assists in understanding the
manner in which the NAFTA governments are choosing a forum, on
a case-by-case basis.
A. NAFTA CHAPTER 20
Overall, eleven matters have reached the consultation stage under
NAFTA Chapter 20 through December 1998. Of these, one matter,
Uranium Exports,'78 was clearly resolved through consultations. Two
cases, Agricultural Products Tariffication'" and Safeguards on
Brooms ("Brooms"),'8 0 were submitted to panels and resulted in final
panel reports, although the Chapter 20 process appears to have re-
solved definitively only one, Agricultural Products Tariffication.
Two matters, Restrictions on Tomato Imports ("Mexican Toma-
177. See infra Parts II.A and II.B (analyzing the disputes among the NAFTA
Parties under Chapter 20 and the WTO).
178. See generally Canada Seeks NAFTA Consultations on U.S.-Russia Ura-
nium Agreement, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 29, 1994), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library [hereinafter Canada Seeks Consultations on Uranium Agreement]
(providing an overview of the relevant issues in the Uranium Erports NAFTA
matter); infira Part II.A. 1 (discussing Uranium Erports dispute).
179. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication,
supra note 91; infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the Agricultural Products Tariffication
dispute).
180. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Brooms, supra note 91; infra Part
II.A.8 (discussing the Broom Corn Brooms dispute).
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toes")'8' and the Helms-Burton Act,12 were essentially resolved
through mechanisms distinct from Chapter 20. The first sugar matter
appears to have been resolved in bilateral consultations between
Canada and the United States,' 3 but a separate sugar related case
between the United States and Mexico is pending.8 4 The latter is
linked to a United States WTO action challenging Mexico's imposi-
tion of antidumping duties on U.S. origin high fructose corn syrup.
Four other matters, Restrictions on Small Package Delivery ("Small
Package Delivey"),8 5  Truck Transport,16 Bus Transport,'87 and
Farm Products Blockade88 also remain pending or, in the case of ag-
ricultural shipments, suspended. The United States has been a party
181. See U.S.-Mexico Consultations to Continue on Trucking, Tomato Quota,
SECOFI Says, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 102, 102 (Jan. 24, 1996) [hereinafter
NAFTA Tomato Consultations]; infra Part II.A.6 (discussing the tomato tariff im-
port dispute).
182. See Canada Unwilling to Challenge Helms-Burton Over Fear of Impact on
NAFTA, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1912, 1912 (Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Can-
ada Unwilling to Challenge]; infra Part II.A.7 (discussing the Helms-Burton Act
dispute).
183. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Exchange of Letters re: Sugar
(visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://infoserve2.ita.gov/tcc/intem>; Canadian Official
Interview, supra note 61; infra Part II.A.3 (discussing Canadian sugar dispute).
184. See Mexico Takes Next Step in Sugar Dispute as U.S. Fights HFCS Duties,
AMERICAS TRADE, Nov. 26, 1998, at 24 [hereinafter Mexico Takes Next Step] (dis-
cussing Mexico's request for a meeting of the Free Trade Commission); infra Parts
III.A.9, III.B.4 (discussing Mexican sugar dispute under NAFTA Chapter 20 and
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body).
185. See generally USTR Asks Mexico For Consultations Over Treatment Of
Express Delivey Firm, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Apr. 27, 1995), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library [hereinafter Consultations Over Package Deliveries]; infr'a
Part II.A.4 (discussing the Small Package Delivery dispute).
186. See NAFTA: Mexico Seeks NAFTA Arbitration Panel on U.S. Resistance to
Mexican Truckers, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library [hereinafter Mexico Seeks Panel on Truckers]; infra Part
II.A.5 (discussing the Truck Transport dispute).
187. See John Nagel, NAFTA: Mexico Calls NAFTA Trade Minister Meeting to
Gain Cross-Border Access for Its Trucks. INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (July 28,
1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library [hereinafter Consultations Sought on
Truck and Bus Access]; infra Part II.A. 11 (discussing the Bus Service dispute).
188. See U.S., Canada Agree to Intensive Trade Talks Aimed at Settling Dis-
putes Over Farm Trade, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 6, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library; infra Part II.A. 10 (discussing the Farm Products Blockade
dispute).
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in all eleven matters, a moving party in three and a respondent in
eight. Mexico has been a moving party in five and a respondent in
two, while Canada has been a moving party in four and a respondent
in one. There have been no cases brought by Mexico against Canada,
or Canada against Mexico.
The volume of final panel decisions is thus considerably less than
those rendered under the CFTA, totaling five decisions in five
years. 89 During that same period, the United States and Canada were
involved in five panel proceedings under GATT Article XXIII.' "
1. Uranium Exports (Can. v. U.S.)
In March 1994, Canada sought consultations with the United
States under Chapter 20 regarding exports of uranium from Canada,
in light of an agreement concluded between the United States and
Russia to resolve an antidumping complaint.'" Canada claimed that
the agreement violated the United States' "national treatment" obli-
189. See FTA Secretariat, In re Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distri-
bution and Sale of U.H.T. Milk front Quebec, USA-93-1807-01, Report of the
Panel (June 3, 1993); FTA Secretariat, In re Interpretation of and Canada "s Com-
pliance With Article 701.3 with Respect to Durum Wheat Sales, CAD-92-1807-01,
Report of the Panel (Feb. 8, 1993); FTA Secretariat, In re Article 304 and the
Definition of Direct Cost of Processing Direct Cost of Assembling, USA-92-1807-
01, Report of the Panel (June 8, 1992); FTA Secretariat, In re Lobstersfrom Can-
ada, USA-89-1807-01, Report of the Panel (May 25, 1990), FTA Secretariat, In re
Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Herring, Salmon, CDA-89-
1807-0 1, Report of the Panel (Oct. 16, 1989).
190. See GATT Secretariat, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Soft-
wood Lumberfo'om Canada, SCM/162, Report of the Panel (Oct. 27, 1993); GATT
Secretariat Panel on Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks By Cana-
dian Provincial Marketing Agencies, L/6304-355/37, Report of the Panel (Mar. 22,
1988); GATT Secretariat, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, DS23/R-39S/206, Report of the Panel (June 19, 1992); GATT Secre-
tariat Panel on Canadian Countervailing Duties on Grain Corn From the United
States, SCM/140 & Corr. 1-39S/411, Report of the Panel (Mar. 26, 1992); GATT
Secretariat, United States-Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Pork from Canada, DS7/R-38S/30, Report of the Panel (July 11,1991); GATT
Secretariat, Canada-Inport Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568-
36S/68, Report of the Panel (Dec. 5, 1989).
191. See Canada Seeks Consultations on Uranium Agreement, supra note 178
(stating that Canada requested consultations with the United States and notified
Mexico).
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gations under both the NAFTA and the GATT. 9 ' The consultations
held in October 1994 apparently produced assurances from the
United States government that Canadian interests would be taken
into account.' 93 As a result, Canada did not seek further redress. Can-
ada presumably could have requested consultations under the dispute
settlement provisions of GATT Article XXIII and the 1979 Anti-
dumping Code, 94 but did not do so, perhaps because it felt the new
NAFTA Chapter 20 procedures were more promising.9"
2. Agricultural Products Tariffication (U.S. v. Can.)
In February 1995, after Canada began to implement the "tariffica-
tion" requirements of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which re-
sulted in a conversion of quotas into high tariff rates, the United
States requested consultations. 96 The United States argued that the
actions, while legal under the WTO with regard to other WTO Mem-
bers, were in conflict with Canada's NAFTA obligations. Formal
consultations, which took place in March 1995, and a referral to the
Free Trade Commission, which met in June 1995, were unsuccessful
in resolving the dispute, and in July 1995, the United States re-
quested that an arbitral panel be convened. Since this was the first
panel request under Chapter 20, delays occurred in the process of
choosing the panelists and the chairperson. Ultimately, in January
1996 the governments selected a distinguished British law professor
as chairman.
97
192. See id. (listing Canada's contentions).
193. See U.S. Barriers Still in Place, Says 1995 Canadian Register, 12 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 624, 625 (Apr. 5, 1995) (stating that "Canada has improved
access to the U.S. market over the past 12 months through consultations, negotia-
tions, and dispute settlement").
194. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 9, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 621.
195. The WTO DSU did not become effective for the United States and Canada
until January 1, 1995.
196. See U.S. Requests Panel to Settle Canada Dairy Dispute, U.S.-MEX. FREE
TRADE REP., Aug. 21, 1995, at 5 (stating that this was the first case under
NAFTA's Chapter 20 dispute settlement process).
197. See NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel Selected in Farm Tariff Flap with Canada,
13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 104, 104 (Jan. 24, 1996). The panel included Cana-
dian law professors Ronald C.C. Cuming and Donald M. McRae, American law
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While the dispute involved both GATT/WTO and NAFTA issues,
the United States probably did not have any reasonable alternative to
Chapter 20. No argument could be made that Canada had violated
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture; rather, Canada's implementa-
tion of its obligations under the WTO led to the charges of NAFTA
violations.
The case involved a direct conflict between Canada's NAFTA and
WTO obligations. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture required
Canada to covert quantitative restrictions to tariffs (a process known
as "tariffication") beginning in 1995. The United States argued that
the imposition of such tariffs for imports on agreed quota levels vio-
lated the NAFTA prohibition on tariff increases and the NAFTA ob-
ligation to progressively reduce tariffs." Canada argued that neither
the CFTA nor NAFTA constituted an agreement on treatment on the
terms of market access for the goods now subject to increased tariff,
and that under the NAFTA, which incorporated certain provisions of
the CFTA, the United States and Canada had agreed that such trade
would be governed by the emerging Uruguay Round agreements."
Specifically, NAFTA, Annex 702.1, incorporates CFTA Article 710,
inter alia, by reference. CFTA Article 710 states that "[u]nless oth-
erwise specifically provided in the Chapter, the Parties retain their
rights and obligations with respect to agricultural, food, beverage,
and certain related goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and agreements negotiated under the GATT, in-
cluding their rights and obligations under GATT Article XI.''"0
GATT Article XI generally prohibits quantitative restraints, but pro-
vides certain exceptions for agricultural products. Under those cir-
cumstances, the replacement of non-tariff barriers with tariffs for ag-
ricultural products in accordance with the WTO Agreement on
professors Sidney Picker, Jr. and Stephen Zamora, and British law professor Elihu
Lauterpacht. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffi-
cation, supra note 91, at *1-*2.
198. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 301(1)-(2). See also NAFTA Dispute Panel
Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication, supra note 9 1, at *6.
199. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication,
supra note 91, at *9.
200. CFTA, supra note 16, art. 710.
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Agriculture was consistent with Canada's obligations under the
NAFTA.2'
On July 16, 1996, the panel issued a preliminary report to the par-
ties that essentially accepted the Canadian viewpoint.02 After a
comment period that ultimately delayed issuance of the final report,
the panel issued a final report0 3 on December 2, 1996 that unani-
mously supported the Canadian analysis of the issues. The Report
accepted the Canadian thesis that CFTA Article 710, preserving
Canada's GATT rights, had been incorporated into NAFTA-
through Annex 702.1-and rejected American contentions that the
generally applicable NAFTA restrictions on tariff increases should
prevail. It also accepted Canada's contention that even though CFTA
Article 710 makes no reference to successor agreements to the
GATT, later GATT modifications, including the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, effectively should be incorporated into the CFTA and
NAFTA.2 4
Given that this was the first panel convened under Chapter 20, the
fact that the process ultimately required twenty-two months from the
date of the request for consultations to the date of the final report was
neither particularly surprising nor unreasonable.0 5 Much of the delay
201. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication,
supra note 91, at * 25.
202. See generally U.S. Will Pursue Free Access to Canada for Certain Farm
Products, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 26, 1996), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd
Library.
203. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication,
supra note 91, at *81.
204. See id. at *58.
205. See United States Asks for Panel to Examine New Canadian A G Tariffs,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (July 18, 1995), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library;
see also NAFTA Dispute Final Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication, su-
pra note 91, at *2-*3 (setting forth the schedule of the Binational Panel Review).
The schedule was as follows:
February 2, 1995 United States request for consultations
March 1, 1995 Consultations between the Parties
June 1, 1995 United States request for Free Trade Commission meeting
June 7, 1995 Free Trade Commission meeting
July 14, 1995 United States request for panel
January 19, 1996 Panel constituted
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-up to six months-resulted from the disagreement over the selec-
tion of the chairperson of the panel.20' The initial report generated
both initial comments and a panel request for additional views from
Canada, necessitating a three-month delay for the issuance of the fi-
nal report.20" Since the panel supported existing Canadian actions, the
issue of implementation did not arise. Nevertheless, the United States
Government promised to continue to press Canada to eliminate the
increased duties on agricultural products and facilitate better market
access. 20
8
3. Import Restrictions on Sugar (Can. v. U.S.)
Also in February 1995, Canada requested consultations regarding
American import restraints on sugar imported from Canada.'", Can-
ada was apparently concerned that United States implementation of
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture prejudiced Canadian sugar ex-
ports to the United States, and that the implementation violated both
the NAFTA and the WTO agreements.! ' Consultations were initially
unsuccessful, and the matter was referred to the Free Trade Commis-
sion. In a related matter, Canadian sugar producers filed an anti-
dumping action against refined sugar from the United States, which
resulted in the imposition of antidumping duties. Specifically, the bi-
July 15, 1996 Initial Panel report circulated to the Parties
December 2, 1996 Final Panel report issued
Id.
206. See NAFTA Dispute Panel in Place to Review Canadian Agriculture Tar-
if, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 23, 1996), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Li-
brary.
207. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffication,
supra note 91, at *4 (stating that "the fact of these exchanges meant that the panel
was not in a position to present its Final Report to the disputing Parties on August
15, 1996 as previously determined").
208. See NAFTA Panel Upholds Canada in Dispute Over High Tarijs on U.S.
Daiy Products, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 4, 1996), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library.
209. See Canadian Government Seeks NAFT4 Talks on U.S. Restrictions on
Sugar Exports, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Feb. 14, 1995), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library (explaining Canada's application for formal procedures after in-
formal discussions did not yield results).
210. See id.
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national panel convened under NAFTA Chapter 19 affirmed the an-
tidumping determination upon remand.2 ' At this time, Canadian
government officials denied before Parliament that the filing of the
antidumping action would prevent the continuation of bilateral con-
sultations. Ultimately, perhaps as a result of increased pressure from
its sugar producers, Canada negotiated a quota agreement with the
United States.2
4. Restrictions on Small Package Delivery (U.S. v. Mex.)
In April 1995, the United States sought consultations with Mexico
arising out of Mexico's refusal to provide "national treatment" to an
American-owned package delivery firm-the United Parcel Service
("UPS"). Mexico refused to allow UPS to utilize the same large
trucks as its Mexican competitors."' While the dispute apparently
was discussed in a meeting of the Free Trade Commission, there has
been no formal resolution of the case, even though "informal" dis-
cussions were reported to be continuing as late as October 1996.14
Meanwhile, UPS announced that it planned to abandon its Mexican
operations, contending that "[b]urdensome customs procedures and
protectionist regulatory practices have made our ground service to
Mexico inefficient and costly to operate., 21 '5 As this issue related
solely to Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, there was no basis for pursing
the matter before the WTO.
211. See In re Final Determinations of Dumping Regarding Certain Refined
Sugar Refined from Sugar Cane or Sugar Beets, in Granulated, Liquid and Pow-
dered Form, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, CDA-
95-1904-04, Memorandum Opinion and Order, (Oct. 9, 1996); see also NAFTA
Secretariat Status Report, supra note 128, at 8.
212. See Canadian Official Interview, supra note 61; see also Exchange of Let-
ters, supra note 183.
213. See Consultations Over Package Delivery, supra note 185 (describing the
United States' decision to request formal consultations under Chapter 20).
214. See Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order
12,901, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,827, 52,832 (1996).
215. Martha Brannigan, UPS Cancels Land Service to Mexico, WALL ST. J., July
12, 1995, at A2 (discussing UPS' complaints about Mexican government proce-
dures).
1064 [14:1025
NAFTA/WTO CHOICE OF FORUM
5. Truck Transport (Mex. v. U.S.)
In January 1996, Mexico requested consultations with the United
States regarding the refusal of the United States to comply with
NAFTA requirements permitting the trucks of one country to deliver
goods in the border states of the other country as of December 17,
1995.2'6 The United States cited safety concerns for deferring imple-
mentation of the NAFTA requirements,217 and the Teamsters' Union
sought to enjoin Mexican truck access for similar reasons.", Unsuc-
cessful consultations began in April 1996,2"9 and have continuously
failed to resolve the dispute. Finally, in July 19982 ° Mexico formally
requested a meeting of the Free Trade Commission and in August
19 9 8 ,n' the Commission convened to discuss the same dispute. On
216. See Mexico Seeks Panel On Truckers, supra note 186 (discussing an-
nouncement of request and justifications for consultations); Mexico Erpects to
Consult on Trucking Under NAFTA Chapter 20 Official Says, 13 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 69, 69 (Jan. 17, 1996). Cf generally Pamela C. Schmidt, Comment,
NAFTA: The Effect of tire Motor Carrier Provisions on the Future of the Agree-
ment, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 505 (1997) (analyzing the trucking
provisions of the NAFTA); NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex I (providing Mexico and
United States' NAFTA requirements regarding Transportation: Land Transporta-
tion, Trucking, Courier Services, Intercity and Rural Bus Transportation, Bus
Charter Service). As of three years from the date of signature of NAFTA-De-
cember 17, 1992-the United States must allow Mexican truck lines to operate
such services in the four American border states, and Mexico must permit United
States truck lines to work in the ten Mexican border states; as of six years from the
date of signature-which would have been December 17, 1998-Mexico and the
United States are to provide each other's trucks with full access to the other's ter-
ritory for international shipments. See Schmidt, supra, at 505-06.
217. See Consultations Sought on Bus and Thick Access, supra note 187 (stating
that the "U.S. government denied access to Mexican truckers, saying that Mexican
vehicles failed to meet U.S. safety standards"). Cf NAFT4 Mexico and United
States Examne Safety Process For Trucks, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Apr. 24,
1996), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library [hereinafter Mexico and United States
Examrine Safety Process].
218. See Diane Lindquist, Teamsters Tn' and Put Brakes on All of NAFTA, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 9, 1996, at C-2 (describing the Teamsters Union's intent
to delay the implementation of NAFTA provisions allowing Mexican cargo trucks
in four American states bordering Mexico).
219. See Mexico and United States Etamne Safet ' Process, supra note 219.
220. See Consultations Sought on Truck and Bus Access, supra note 187.
221. See John Nagel, NAFTA Cross-Border Trucking Group Meets: Little Prog-
ress Reported, More Meetings Set, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Aug. 21, 1998),
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September 23, 1998, after the Commission failed to resolve the dis-
pute, the Mexican government requested the creation of an arbitral
panel.2 2 As the matter relates solely to an interpretation of NAFTA1 "1 . • 221
obligations, there was no basis for Mexico to seek adjudication by
the WTO.
6. Restrictions on Tomato Imports (Mex. v. U.S.)
Responding to United States implementation of a tariff-rate quota
on tomatoes from Mexico, the Mexican government requested
Chapter 20 consultations in January 1996.2 However, resolution of
the tomato quota dispute occurred via a separate United States anti-
dumping action against Mexican tomatoes pursuant to a suspension
agreement concluded under American antidumping laws. 225 Under
the agreement, Mexican tomato growers agreed to raise prices to
eliminate the injurious effect of dumping.2 26 Therefore, there is no
evidence that the Chapter 20 mechanism was instrumental in resolv-
ing the dispute. Mexico also filed a request for WTO consultations,
which is discussed below in Part II.B. 1.
7. Helms-Burton Act (Mex. and Can. v. U.S.)
In March 1996, Canada requested Chapter 20 consultations as a
result of the United States enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, 27 and
available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library.
222. See Mexico Seeks NAFTA Arbitration Panel on U.S. Resistance to Mexican
Truckers, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd
Library.
223. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1202, Annex I (outlining standards for na-
tional treatment).
224. See NAFTA Tomato Consultations, supra note 181, at 102 (stating that the
United States' "proposal to alter the regime under which quotas for Mexican to-
mato imports are calculated came after complaints by Florida Tomato growers that
surges of Mexican tomatoes entering the United States were decimating the Florida
industry").
225. See Suspension of Antidumping Investigation: Fresh Tomatoes from Mex-
ico, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,618, 56,619 (1996) (reporting the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment's suspension of antidumping investigation involving fresh tomatoes from
Mexico).
226. See id. (summarizing resolution of investigation).
227. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. secs.
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Mexico exercised its NAFTA rights to participate in the consulta-
tions. Both countries argued that the provisions of the Act creating
a private right of action for American citizens, including naturalized
Cuban-Americans, against foreign companies who were "trafficking"
in property expropriated by the Castro regime and limitations on
travel in the United States for executives of such "trafficking" for-
eign parties could be violations of various provisions of the
NAFTA.229 The Free Trade Commission convened in mid-1996 to
discuss the issues, but did not resolve the dispute-'r due to Canadian
concerns that a final disposition would adversely impact other
NAFTA benefits. 231 The European Union brought a parallel action in
the WTO, but the European Union indefinitely suspended the matter
after President Clinton agreed to exercise his authority under the Act
to suspend the private right of action provisions-at six month inter-
vals-and to seek legislation that would overturn the immigration
provisions of the Act. 2
Neither Canada nor Mexico joined the European Union action
against the United States nor have they pursued the action brought
under Chapter 20. Contending that Helms-Burton violated both the
NAFTA and the GATT/WTO rules, however, Canada and Mexico
could have joined the European Union's WTO action at the outset in
lieu of seeking a NAFTA Chapter 20 resolution. As discussed above,
6021-91 (1996).
228. See NAFTA: Canada Files Formal NAFTA Challenge of U.S. Law Blocking
Trade With Cuba, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 14, 1996), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library.
229. See NAFTA, supra note 1, chs. 11, 16. Arguably, the legislation violated
the national treatment provisions of Chapter II (relating to investment) and the
business travel provisions of Chapter 16 (temporary entry for business purposes).
230. See NAFTA Designates Confer on Complaint Against Helms-Burton Under
Chapter 20, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1093, 1093 (July 3, 1996).
231. See Canada Unwilling to Challenge, supra note 182, at 1912-13 (describ-
ing Canada's reluctance to challenge Helms-Burton under the NAFTA or the
WTO).
232. See United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, May
3, 1996, WTO Doe. No. XVT/DS38. The European Union suspended this request
on April 21, 1997, and the Panel's authority lapsed on April 22, 1998, under DSU
Article 12.12. See EU Suspends Effort to Challenge in 17O Helms-Burton Legis-
lation, 14 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) 742 (Apr. 23, 1997); see also DSU, supra note
2, art. 12.12.
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once they initiated the NAFTA action, Canada and Mexico were pre-
cluded under the NAFTA from raising the same issues at the WTO.233
Presumably, Mexico and Canada chose the NAFTA consultations
mechanism because the Helms-Burton immigration provisions were
arguably a violation of the NAFTA14 and the various WTO agree-
ments do not contain provisions relating directly to immigration.
8. Safeguards on Brooms (Mex. v. U.S.)
When the United States applied safeguards. 5 under United States
law on broom corn brooms in August 1996, Mexico requested
Chapter 20 consultations. 36 Neither consultations nor Free Trade
Commission discussions were successful.23 7 In December 1996,
Mexico exercised its rights under the NAFTA238 and retaliated
233. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005.6 (stating that "forum selected shall be
used to the exclusion of the other").
234. See id. ch. 16 (incorporating NAFTA provisions that the Helms-Burton Act
arguably violates concerning temporary entry of business persons).
235. See NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Brooms, supra note 91 (explaining
tariff obligations on broom corn brooms under the NAFTA). Under the NAFTA,
imports into the United States of the brooms affected by the safeguards action had
been entirely duty free as of January 1, 1994-valued at not more than 96 cents-
or duty-free until a quota of 100,000 dozen units had been imported, after which
the tariff was 22.4 0/o--brooms valued at over 96 cents per unit. See id. at 1-2.
Acting under authority of NAFTA Chapter 8, President Clinton established a three
tariff-rate quota on the first category of brooms on November 28, 1996, under
which all brooms over 121,478 dozen were subject to a tariff of 33 cents the first
year, 32.5 cents the second year, and 32.1 cents the third year. See id. at 4. For the
second category, brooms imported within the 100,000 units quota remained duty
free, but the tariff on imports in excess of the quota was raised from 22.4% to 33%
the first year, 32.5% the second year, and 32.1% the third year. See id. at 4-5.
236. See Mexico Requests NAFTA Consultations Over Broom Corn Brooms
Ruling by US., INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Aug. 28, 1996), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library.
237. See NAFTA Dispute Final Report on Brooms, supra note 91, at 5 (ex-
plaining that Mexico and the United States held consultations in September and
October 1996, and that Mexico requested a meeting of the Free Trade Commission
on November 25, 1996).
238. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 802.6 (stating that "[i]f the Parties con-
cerned are unable to agree on compensation, the Party against whose goods the ac-
tion is taken may take action having trade effects substantially equivalent to the
action taken"). Retaliation is also permitted after a Chapter 20 panel decision if the
losing party does not comply with the results. See id. art. 2019.
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against the American safeguards action by raising Mexican tariffs on
table wines and other liquor products, certain furniture, flat glass,
and chemically pure sugar products. "9 The Mexican government ex-
plicitly chose these items because Mexico perceived the items as po-
litically-sensitive and influential.2' ° Mexico requested the establish-
ment of a NAFTA Chapter 20 panel in January 1997, which was
ultimately created in July 1997.24"
In Brooms, Mexico argued that the United States' safeguards ac-
tion violated both the NAFTA and the GATT; this contention
marked the first and only time that a NAFTA Party has asked a
NAFTA Chapter 20 panel to decide issues under both agreements.
First, Mexico argued that the United States International Trade
Commission ("USITC") violated the "completeness, consistency and
transparency" requirements of NAFTA when it determined the level
of injury to United States broom corn producers. In particular, Mex-
ico disagreed with the USITC's determination that the relevant
United States "domestic industry" consisted only of broom corn
broom producers, rather than all broom producers-including those
whom manufactured broom of plastic. 42 Thus, Mexico contended be-
fore the panel that the USITC's definition of "like product"-broom
corn brooms rather than all brooms-was inconsistent with either the
GATT or NAFTA requirements, and, in any event, was not properly
explained in the USITC opinion.'43 Furthermore, Mexico argued that
239. See NAFTA: Mexico Raises Tariffs on U.S. Goods in Response to Corn
Broom Safeguard, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 16, 1996), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (reporting Mexico's announcement regarding tariff in-
creases from 2% to 20% on certain American products).
240. See id. (quoting Secretaria de Comercio y Fometo Industrial (SECOFI) of-
ficials).
241. See NAFTA Dispute Final Report on Brooms, supra note 91, at 6. The
panelists consisted of two American law professors, Robert E. Hudec and John H.
Barton; a Mexican attorney/law professor; Dionisio Kaye; a Mexican attorney,
Raymundo Enriquez; and an Australian government official, Paul O'Connor, as
chairperson. See id. at 29.
242. See id. at 10.
243. See id. (arguing that the ITC determination rested on a definition of "like-
product" that was not in accordance with the correct legal definition of that term in
GATT/WTO and NAFTA agreements and certain elements of the ITC failed to
conform with NAFTA Article 803 and Annex 803.3); see also NAFTA, supra note
1, art. 803 and Annex 803.3. The choice of the domestic industry and like product
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the dispute arose under both the NAFTA and GATT, and therefore,
under NAFTA Articles 802.1 and 2005, Mexico had the option of
seeking dispute resolution under either NAFTA Chapter 20 or the
GATT/WTO alternative.244
In contrast, the United States, in addition to defending the "do-
mestic industry" and "like product" findings of the USITC, argued
that the NAFTA panel lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity
of "global safeguard measures" under the WTO, because GATT Ar-
ticle XIX and the safeguards agreement had not been explicitly in-
corporated by reference into NAFTA Article 802.1.245 In its final re-
port, the panel sidestepped the procedural issue of whether it had
jurisdiction to determine whether the United States safeguards action
was inconsistent with GATT Article XIX and the WTO Agreement
on Safeguards. It decided instead that "it was possible to dispose of
the issues in dispute under the NAFTA agreement alone," in part be-
cause the provisions of the NAFTA and the WTO Safeguards
Agreement have essentially the same requirements with regard to the
requirement that the investigating authority-the USITC in the
United States-set out its findings and conclusions in detail. 6 The
panel further observed the following:
is critical to a finding of "serious injury" in a safeguards case. See NAFTA Dispute
Final Report on Brooms, supra note 91, at 7. If the United States industry and the
like product are limited to broom corn brooms, the USITC compares American
production of broom corn brooms to imports of broom corn brooms. See i. Mex-
ico contended that the ITC analysis should have been based on analysis of the eco-
nomic condition of both groups of United States producers-plastic brooms and
broom corn brooms-as a result of increased imports of broom corn brooms. See
id.
244. NAFTA Article 802.1 provides in pertinent part that "Each Party reiterates
its rights and obligations under Article XIX of GATT or any safeguards agreement
pursuant thereto .. " NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 802.1; see also NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 2005.1 (providing that disputes arising under NAFTA, GATT, or "suc-
cessor agreements" can be adjudicated in either forum); see also NAFTA Dispute
Final Report on Brooms, supra note 91, at 11 (discussing the panel's jurisdiction
over GATT/WTO issues).
245. NAFTA Dispute Final Report on Brooms, supra note 91, at 10. The United
States also raised certain procedural arguments. See id. (arguing that Mexico
"failed to give timely notice" of the claim).
246. See id. at 19 (applying NAFTA Annex 803.3(12) and Art. 3.1 of the WTO
Safeguards Code).
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Since the NAFTA and WTO versions of the rule are substantively identi-
cal, application of the WTO version of the rule would have in no way
changed the legal conclusion reached under NAFTA 803.3(12). Accord-
ingly, the panel chose to rest its decision entirely on NAFTA Annex
803.3(12), without relying on Article 3.1 of the W17o Safeguards Code.'
Since it is unlikely that the panel would chose this analysis over
the objections of Mexico and the United States, one may speculate
that at some time during the panel process-perhaps after the interim
opinion was circulated to the Parties"4 -the two governments agreed
to accept a decision based solely on the NAFTA. Perhaps either or
both countries were mindful that a decision based on GATT Article
XIX or the WTO Safeguards Agreement would create a precedent
that might be relied upon in the future by a WTO panel; whereas, a
decision based solely on NAFTA Chapter 8 could have repercussions
only for future safeguards disputes under NAFTA.
On the merits, the panel concluded that the USITC's definition of
"domestic industry" had indeed been critical. Since plastic brooms
were displacing broom corn brooms within the United States market,
the limitation of the domestic industry to broom corn brooms "in-
creased the likelihood of finding injury."'According to the panel,
this necessarily raised the "like product" issue, which the USITC de-
cision failed to address.20 Thus, the panel concluded that "the ITC's
determination on the issue of 'domestic industry' is inconsistent with
U.S. obligations under NAFTA, Annex 803.3(12) of the NAFTA
Agreement,""' and the panel recommended that the United States
"bring its conduct into compliance with the NAFTA at the earliest
possible time.' ' 2
247. Id.
248. See id. at 6 (stating that documents were circulated on December 23, 1997,
with comments provided to the Panel on January 16, 1998).
249. Id. at 22.
250. See id. (stating that the like-product definition is "therefore a central issue
in this case").
251. NAFTA Dispute Final Report on Brooms, supra note 91, at 27.
252. Id. at 29.
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The time between the request for consultations and the final panel
report-seventeen months25 -does not appear to be unreasonable.
However, in this second Chapter 20 action six months passed from
the date of the request to the creation of the panel2 4 and the United
States did not comply with the panel recommendation until Decem-
ber 3, 1998-nine months after the issuance of the report2" and a
year before the safeguards were scheduled to expire. 6 In the Presi-
dential Proclamation terminating the safeguards, President Clinton
stated that he was acting because the United States industry had not
made a positive adjustment to import competition as a result of the
safeguards, a conclusion squarely based on a USITC Report.5 8
Also, pressure exerted by American industries subject to retaliation
can be viewed as a catalyst for the termination of the safeguards. " In
253. See id. at 5-6 (setting forth the schedule of the Binational Panel Review).
The schedule was as follows:
August 21, 1996 Mexican request for consultations
September 6, 1996 Consultations between the Parties
October 9, 1996 Consultations between the Parties
November 25, 1996 Mexican request for Free Trade Commission Meeting
December 11, 1996 Free Trade Commission Meeting
January 14, 1997 Mexico request for panel
July 17, 1997 Panel constituted
December 23, 1997 Initial panel report circulated to the Parties
January 30, 1997 Final Panel Report issued
Id.
254. See id. at 5-6.
255. See Tariffs: Clinton Removes Safeguard Tariffs on Broom Corn Brooms,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Dec. 7, 1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library
[hereinafter Clinton Removes Safeguard] (reporting Clinton's December 3, 1998,
announcement that "temporary duties" would be removed).
256. See Proclamation No. 6961, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,431, 64,432 (Dec. 4, 1996)
(proclaiming November 27, 1999, as the sunset date).
257. See Proclamation No. 7154, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,761, 67,762 (Dec. 8, 1998)
(ordering the termination of temporary duties on imports of broom corn brooms).
258. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., Broom Corn Brooms: Efforts of Workers and
Firms in the Industry to Make a Positive Adjustment to Import Competition,
USITC Pub. No. 3122, at 17 (Aug. 1998).
259. See Industries Press USTR for Early Lifting of Broomcorn Safeguard Tar-
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any event, the proclamation terminating the safeguards relied entirely
on the President's domestic legal authority and did not mention ei-
ther NAFTA or the panel decision.2' 0 The Mexican government indi-
cated that Mexican retaliatory tariffs imposed before the panel pro-
ceeding would be terminated. 6'
9. Restrictions on Sugar (MAex. v. U.S.)
In March 1998, Mexico requested Chapter 20 consultations with
the United States regarding revised quotas on imports of Mexican
sugar and sweeteners, which Mexico claimed to be inconsistent with
a side letter negotiated as part of the NAFTA.6 "2 In November 1998,
Mexico took the necessary second step, requesting a meeting of the
Free Trade Commission.26 To date, the United States government
has rejected most of Mexico's demands for significant increases in
sugar exports to the United States, indicating a reluctance to make
concessions so long as Mexico maintains its antidumping duties on
high fructose corn syrup.26' It is evident that Mexico seeks a compre-
hensive settlement in which Mexican access to American high fruc-
tose corn syrup would equal United States access to Mexican
/f, AMERICAS TRADE, Oct. 1, 1998, at 11 (reporting that United States firms that
faced increased Mexican tariffs on their products as a result of Mexican retaliation
had periodically called upon the United States government to terminate the broom
corn broom safeguards before their scheduled expiration in late 1999).
260. See Proclamation No. 7154, supra note 257, at 67,762 (stating that Section
204 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to terminate a safeguard ac-
tion).
261. See AMERICAS TRADE, Dec. 24, 1998, at 8.
262. See NAFTA Mexico and United States Hold Talks on Sugar Sweetener
Dispute, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Apr. 22, 1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd
Library (reporting on the first round of negotiations); see also USTR Launches In-
vestigation Against Mexican Corn Syrup Practices, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA)
(May 19, 1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library [hereinafter USTR Launches
Investigation] (noting that United States Trade Representative accepted a Section
301 of the 1974 Trade Act petition by United States corn refiners against certain
Mexican practices on high fructose syrup).
263. See Mexico Takes Next Step, supra note 184, at 24.
264. See USTR Limits Mexican Sugar Access to NAFT4 with Small Exception,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 25, 1998, at 11-12 (stating that "Mexican efforts to pres-
sure the United States for more access to its sugar market proved unsuccessful"
and the "U.S. will continue to limit imports from Mexico").
1999] 1073
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
261
sugar. In response to the Mexican antidumping action, the Ameri-
can sugar industry has brought an action under NAFTA Chapter 19
challenging the Mexican administrative decision imposing anti-
dumping duties.266 Finally, a WTO panel is currently being formed to
267review the same Mexican antidumping duty determination.
Significantly, and separately, the United States government has
initiated a case under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 chal-
lenging Mexican restrictions on sugar imports as being "unreason-
able"-burdening or restricting American commerce, but not violat-
ing any international trade agreement.26 This is one of only two
matters to date in which two NAFTA Parties-the United States and
Mexico-have simultaneously pursued their dispute settlement op-
tions under NAFTA Chapter 20 and the WTO's DSB for related as-
pects of a common dispute. The Chapter 20 panel does not have ju-
risdiction over challenges to Mexico's antidumping laws.269
10. Farm Products Blockade (Can. v. U.S.)
In September 1998, Canada requested NAFTA Chapter 20 con-
sultations, alleging that the states of South Dakota and Montana in
the United States are blocking imports of Canadian farm products on
the basis of false claims-that the products raise safety and health
concerns and violate a series of NAFTA and WTO provisions.27° The
request letter cites United States obligations under NAFTA Articles
265. See Mexico Takes Next Step, supra note 184, at 24.
266. See id. at 23.
267. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the United States-Mexico WTO High
Fructose Corn Syrup proceedings).
268. See USTR Launches Investigation, supra note 262 (discussing acceptance
of section 301 petition); see also Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Re-
quest for Public Comment: Mexican Practices Affecting High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS), 63 Fed. Reg. 28,544, 28,544-45 (May 26, 1998) [hereinafter Initiation of
HFCS Investigation] (announcing USTR investigation).
269. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2004 (stating that antidumping and counter-
vailing duty matters are excluded from Chapter 20 jurisdiction).
270. See Canada Requests WTO, NAFTA Consultations Over Farm Blockade,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 25, 1998, at 4; see also Canadian Request for NAFTA
Consultations, AMERICAS TRADE, Oct. 1, 1998, at 24 (reprinting Sept. 24, 1998,
letter from Canadian Trade Minister Sergio Marchi to United States Trade Repre-
sentative Charlene Barshefsky).
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105, 301, 309, 712, 904, 1202, 1203, 1204 and Annex 2004-chap-
ters relating to general obligations, removal of trade restrictions,
phytosanitary and sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade,
cross-border services and dispute resolution!" Canada has also filed
a parallel request with the WTO, citing solely WTO provisions."
Pending further bilateral discussions both actions are currently sus-
pended,13 and the two governments appear to be moving toward a
negotiated solution as of this writing.2 The Canadian decision to file
simultaneous actions under the NAFTA and the WTO, in addition to
possible political pressure considerations, takes into account the pos-
sibility that judicious framing of the issues might allow parallel ac-
tions to go forward on different "matters" relating to the same dis-
pute. For example, Canada might challenge the allegedly false health
and safety concerns under the NAFTA's Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasurs . . 275
Measures provisions, 2 and denial of entry under the quantitative re-
straint prohibitions of GATT, Article XI.
27'
11. Bus Service (Mex. v. U.S.)
On October 30, 1998, the Mexican Commerce Minister announced
that Mexico had requested a panel under Chapter 20, challenging the
United States Department of Transportation's refusal to approve ap-
plications for operating authority that would permit Mexican sched-
271. See Canadian Request for NAFTA Consultations. supra note 270, at 24
(listing NAFTA Articles).
272. See Canadian Request for JTfO Consultations, AMERICAS TRADE, Oct. 1,
1998, at 24-25 (reprinting Canada's September 29, 1998 request for consultations
on Certain Measures Affecting the hnport of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Can-
ada).
273. See Agriculture: U.S., Canada Agree to Intensive Trade Talks Aimed at
Settling Disputes Over Farm Trade, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 6, 1998),
available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library.
274. See U.S. Trade Rep., USDA Announces Series of New Measures to Open
Canadian Farm Markets, USTR Press Release 98-107 (Dec. 4, 1998), available in
<http://vwvw.ustr.gov/releasesf1998/12/98-107.pdf> (announcing an initial agree-
ment between the United States and Canada on removing trade restrictions on the
trade of hogs, cattle, and wheat).
275. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 7, sec. B.
276. See Canadian Official Interview, supra note 61 (opining that one could
raise a challenge under the WTO concerning a customs issue).
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uled bus service between Mexico and the United States.2"' The Mexi-
can action followed consultations and an August 1998 meeting of the
Free Trade Commission that did not resolve the dispute.278 Since
there are no provisions of the WTO agreement relating to cross-
border bus service, Mexico's only recourse in this matter was to
Chapter 20.
B. WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
As of October 1998, there have been five formal requests for con-
sultation under the DSU by one or more NAFTA Parties against an-
other NAFTA Party. Of these, the United States was the moving
party in three matters and the respondent in two, while Mexico was
the moving party in one and the responding party in one, and Canada
was the moving party in one and the respondent in two. As under
Chapter 20, there were no disputes between Canada and Mexico.
1. Mexican Tomatoes (Mex. v. U.S.)
In July 1996, Mexico requested consultations with the United
States regarding an American antidumping investigation of imports
of fresh and chilled tomatoes from Mexico, alleging violations of the
WTO Antidumping Agreement 9 Mexico sought expedited proce-
dures because of the "perishable" nature of the product.280 Although
the request was apparently never formally withdrawn, the parties ul-
timately resolved the dispute with a suspension agreement concluded
277. See Mexico Seeks NAFTA Arbitration Panel on U.S. Resistance to Mexican
Bus Service, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 3, 1998), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library (quoting the SECOFI 's announcement). The United States is obli-
gated to permit Mexican persons to provide cross-border scheduled bus services
three years after the date of entry into force of NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 1,
Annex 1.
278. See Consultations Sought on Truck and Bus Access, supra note 187; Mex-
ico Seeks NAFTA Arbitration Panel on U.S. Resistance to Mexican Bus Service,
supra note 277.
279. See United States-Antidumping Investigation Regarding Imports of Fresh
or Chilled Tomatoes from Mexico, Request for Consultations, July 8, 1996, WTO
Doc. No. WT/DS49/1 [hereinafter WTO Tomato Request for Consultations]; see
also Mexico Seeks WTO Consultations Over U.S. Review of Tomato Imports, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA) (July 2, 1996), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library.
280. See WTO Tomato Request for Consultations, supra note 279.
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under.the United States antidumping laws.2"' However, both the
WTO and the Department of Commerce consider the case "settled"
or "inactive." 2 Had the antidumping action resulted in a final anti-
dumping determination appealable under NAFTA Chapter 19, it is
likely that the matter would have been pursued in that forum as well.
2. Split-Run Periodicals (U.S. v. Can.)
In March 1996, the United States asked Canada for consultations
under the DSU on (i) Canadian measures that prohibited the impor-
tation into Canada of periodicals that contained advertising directed
to the Canadian market that was not contained in issues distributed in
the country of origin; (ii) Canadian assessment of an 80 percent ex-
cise tax on such "split-run" periodicals when more than 20 percent of
the editorial content is the same as in issues distributed in the country
of origin; and (iii) postal rates applicable to Canadian owned and
controlled periodicals for distribution in Canada but not to imported
periodicals. 283 After consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the
parties submitted the dispute to panel review and Appellate Body re-
view. This is the only case among NAFTA Parties that has become
final under the WTO's DSU.
In this case, the United States' reason for choosing the WTO fo-
rum over the NAFTA Chapter 20 forum was obvious. Under the
GATT, the United States could argue that the Canadian restrictions
violated the "national treatment" requirement and provisions prohib-
iting quantitative restraints.2 Under the NAFTA, in contrast, Cana-
dian discrimination against foreign owned or produced periodicals
was explicitly permitted. A NAFTA exception incorporated by refer-
ence the CFTA definition of "cultural industry" to include, inter alia,
"the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodi-
cals or newspapers" and to generally exempt the aforementioned
281. See Suspension of Antidumping Investigation: Fresh Tomatoes from Mex-
ico, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,618, 56,619 (1996).
282. WTO Dispute Overview, supra note 10, at *23.
283. See Report of the WTO Panel, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Peri-
odicals, Mar. 14, 1997, NVTO Doc. No. WTiDS3 IIR at 1-4 [hereinafter \VTO Pe-
riodicals Panel Report].
284. See GATT, supra note 18, arts. III, XI.
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from the provisions of the Agreement."' Because of the grounding of
the United States allegations on provisions of GATT 1994, there was
no question with regard to WTO panel jurisdiction, except with re-
gard to the excise tax, which Canada claimed was a service measure
rather than relating to trade in goods.286
The reviewing panel, composed of citizens of Sweden, Brazil, and
Austria, determined that the import ban was a violation of GATT
Article XI, and the excise tax a violation of Article 111:4.87 However,
the panel rejected the U.S. challenge to the preferential postal rates,
on the grounds that the rates were a permitted subsidy under GATT
Article 111:8(b).288 Both Canada and the United States cross-appealed.
The appeal, heard by the Japanese, German, and Uruguayan mem-
bers of the Appellate Body, effectively affirmed the appealed aspects
of the panel decision on the import ban and excise tax issues, and re-
versed the panel on the issue of preferential postal rates, determining
that the latter were also a violation of Article III of the GATT." 9 The
Appellate Body also confirmed the panel determination that the
GATT 1994 was applicable to periodicals, rejecting again the Cana-
dian argument that the excise tax was a services measure.290
Canada notified the DSB of its intent to comply with the panel and
appellate reports, and agreed with the United States that compliance
would occur within fifteen months. 9' Specifically, progress reports
on implementation were to be submitted before each monthly DSB
meeting after March 25, 1998.292
285. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2106, Annex 2106; see also CFTA, supra note
16, arts. 2005, 2012.
286. See WTO Periodicals Panel Report, supra note 283, at 16 (explaining that
the excise tax was a measure pertaining to advertising services).
287. See id. at 68 (determining that the steps taken by the Canadian government
constituted a contravention of Articles 111(4) and XI of the GATT).
288. See id.
289. See Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures Con-
cerning Periodicals, June 30, 1997, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS3 I/AB/R, at 35-38.
290. See id. at 20-22.
291. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 164, at 69.
292. See id.
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The Split-Run Periodicals case demonstrates what many perceive
as a significant advantage of the WTO process, as compared to expe-
rience to date under NAFTA Chapter 20. While the time period be-
tween the request for consultations and the issuance of the final panel
report in the Split-Run Periodicals is only slightly shorter than the
period in the Agricultural Products Tariffication ' and Brooms
cases-fifteen and a half months 9 ' compared to twenty-two months"
and seventeen months,' 97 respectively-initial compliance appeared
to be achieved quite rapidly under the DSB, while compliance in
Brooms was delayed for nine months. In July 1998, however, the Of-
fice of the United States Trade Representative requested consulta-
tions with Canada regarding proposed Canadian legislation that
would prohibit Canadian companies from advertising in split-run
editions of foreign magazines, suggesting that such legislation would
be inconsistent with the WTO ruling. 9 9 In January 1999, the United
293. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Agricultural Products Tariji'cation
case under NAFTA Chapter 20).
294. See supra Part II.A.8 (discussing the Safeguards on Brooms case under
NAFTA Chapter 20).
295. See WTO Periodicals Panel Report, supra note 283, at I. The schedule was
as follows:
March 11, 1996 United States request for consultations
April 10, 1996 Consultations between the Parties
May 24, 1996 United States request for establishment of Panel
June 19, 1996 DSB establishes Panel
February 21, 1997 Panel report circulated confidentially to the Parties
March 14, 1997 Final panel report issued
April 29, 1997 Canada files notice of appeal
June 30, 1997 Appellate Body report issued
July 30, 1997 DSB adopts panel and appellate reports
August 29, 1997 Canada notifies DSB that it will implement the Report
See id.
296. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (setting forth the schedule of the
Agricultural Products Tariffication case).
297. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (setting forth the schedule of the
Safeguards on Brooms case).
298. See WTO Compliance: Barshefsky Says U.S. Response Planned if EU,
Canada Fail to Meet WTO Rulings, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1998),
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States threatened to retaliate against Canadian steel, wood, and tex-
tiles, thereby denying Canada trade benefits, if the Canadian legisla-
tion were passed, contending that "substituting one form of protec-
tionism for another ignores both the letter and spirit of the WTO
rules. 299 Interestingly, certain CFTA provisions, incorporated into
NAFTA's "cultural industries" exception, allow the United States to
retaliate by taking "measures of equivalent commercial effect."3 °
3. Dairy Product Export Subsidies (U.S. v. Can.)
In October 1997, the United States requested consultations re-
garding Canada's tariff rate quota on milk and export subsidies al-
legedly granted by Canada on dairy products. The United States al-
leged that the subsidies were in conflict with the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies; no NAFTA issues were raised.3°' Since consultations were
unsuccessful, the United States requested a panel, which was estab-
lished in March 1998.302The panel is comprised of citizens of Singa-
pore, Mexico, and Germany, and began its work in late August, with
a decision expected by the end of February 1999.303 As discussed
above, in a relatively rare occurrence in the WTO, the process en-
countered delays in selecting the members of the panel as a result of
the United States government's insistence that the panel proceeding
available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (stating that the legislation "looked like a new
prohibition on U.S. companies' ability to do business in Canada").
299. See U.S. Trade Rep Threatens to Deny Canada Trade Benefits if Nell,
Magazine Bill Passes, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 3, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library; see also U.S. Stand Over Magazine Legislation Shows
Lack of Understanding, Minister Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Jan. 14, 1999),
available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (responding to U.S. retaliation that the threats
demonstrate a "profound misunderstanding of the issues involved").
300. CFTA, supra note 16, art. 2005.2 (incorporated into NAFTA under Art.
2106).
301. See Panelist Selection Breaks Deadlock in WTO Case Against Canada
Dairy, AMERICAS TRADE, Aug. 20, 1998, at 7.
302. See Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exporta-
tion of Dairy Products, Request for Consultations, Oct. 13, 1997, WTO Doc. No.
WT/DS 103/1; see also WTO Dispute Overview, supra note 10, at *6.
303. See Panelist Selection Breaks Deadlock in WTO Case Against Canada
Dairy, supra note 301, at 7. As of March 15, 1999, the panel report had not been
adopted and was not publicly available.
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should be open to industry observers." Despite the United States'
urging, there has been no agreement on permitting non-government
observers. Australia and Japan have reserved their third party rights,
assuring that they will also benefit in the event that the panel ulti-
mately finds against Canada. The likelihood of support from non-
NAFTA WTO members may have been a factor encouraging the
United States government to bring the action before the WTO. On
March 16, 1999, the WTO panel sided with the United States and
determined that the Canadian programs constituted export subsidies
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The panel de-
cision is subject to appeal.05
4. High Fructose Corn Syrup (U.S. v. Mex.)
In September 1997 and again in May 1998, the United States re-
quested WTO consultations about an antidumping investigation initi-
ated earlier by Mexico against high fructose corn syrup from the
United States. The earlier investigations resulted in the imposition of
Mexican antidumping duties on United States corn syrup in January
19 9 8 .'06 Since the dispute-which also encompasses United States
restrictions on imports of Mexican sugar under the NAFTA-was
not resolved through WTO consultations, the DSB accepted the
United States' request for the establishment of a panel! 7 The United
States alleges that the Mexican antidumping investigation violated
the WTO Antidumping Agreement by accepting an antidumping pe-
tition against high fructose corn syrup from Mexican sugar produc-
308ers.
304. See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text (detailing the United
States attempts to eliminate secrecy).
305. See Agriculture: USTR Hails WfTO Panel's Decision Striking Down Cana-
dian Dairy Subsidy, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 19, 1999), available in LEXIS,
Bnaitd Library.
306. See, e.g., Mexico-Antidumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States, Request for Consultations, Sept. 15, 1997, WTO
Doc. No. WT/DS 101/1.
307. See Mexico Takes Next Step, supra note 184, at 23-24 (noting that Mexico
requested a meeting of NAFTA trade ministers); see also 1TO Dispute Overview,
supra note 10, at *7 (stating that the DSB established a panel on November 25,
1998).
308. See Mexico Takes Next Step, supra note 184 (noting that, ordinarily, WTO
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5. Farm Products Blockade (Can. v. U.S.)
As noted above, Canada has charged South Dakota and Montana
with blocking the movement of Canadian farm products in violation
of both the NAFTA and WTO requirements. 3°9 The WTO request
cites only violations of WTO obligations, while the NAFTA request
is limited to the alleged violation of NAFTA obligations.1 While
Canada ultimately will be required to choose between WTO and
NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement in the event that the contro-
versy is not resolved through negotiations, Canada is arguably within
its rights in seeking simultaneous consultations in both the NAFTA
and the WTO dispute bodies,"' even though it has avoided raising
WTO violations under the NAFTA and vice versa.
In sum, of these five cases, one case-Mexican Tomatoes-has ef-
fectively been withdrawn because of settlement in non-WTO nego-
tiations, and a second case-Split Run Periodicals-has been ini-
tially resolved through the WTO DSU, although new Canadian
measures threaten to negate the benefits of the victory for the United
States. Two others cases, Dairy Product Export Subsidies and High
Fructose Corn Syrup, are pending and appear likely to be resolved
through WTO dispute settlement unless they are settled earlier. It is
too early to predict how the Farm Products Blockade case will be re-
solved, and in what forum.
rules permit only producers of "an identical or directly competitive product" to
bring an antidumping petition).
309. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing Canada's Septem-
ber 29, 1998, request for WTO consultations on certain measures affecting the im-
port of cattle, swine, and grain from Canada).
310. Compare Mexico Takes Next Step, supra note 184 (reprinting Canada's
request for consultations, which contends that the United States violated provisions
of the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Technical Barriers to
Trade, the Agreement on Agriculture and the Dispute Settlement Understanding),
with Canadian Request for NAFTA Consultations, supra note 270, at 24-25 (listing
alleged violations, including provisions concerning removal of trade restrictions,
phytosanitary and sanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, cross border serv-
ices and dispute resolution).
311. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005.6 (precluding simultaneous proceed-
ings only beginning with the referral of a matter to the Free Trade Commission un-
der the NAFTA).
1082 [14:1025
NAFTA/WTO CHOICE OF FORUM 1
III. THE CHALLENGES OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
OPTIONS: AN ASSESSMENT
A. COMPARISON OF THE Two SYSTEMS
The similarities between the mechanisms created under NAFTA
Chapter 20 and the WTO's DSU, at least on paper, are substantial
and are much greater than the differences. Both systems contemplate
a binding international arbitration process using ad hoc trade experts
as arbitrators, preceded by mandatory consultations, and voluntary
good offices and conciliation. Both are designed to assure a speedy
process in which no Party or Member can significantly delay or im-
pede the result. Both require the issuance of opinions or reports that
show in detail the rationale for decisions. And both contemplate a
process that is protected from public scrutiny or review until com-
pleted. In operation, however, they differ in significant respects, and
these differences, both in jurisdiction and in the nature of the proce-
dures, may alter, or raise the possibility, of altering the result, and
thus may dictate a different forum in specific circumstances.
In operational terms the significant differences between NAFTA
Chapter 20 and the WTO's DSU can be summarized as follows:
1. In terms of jurisdiction, there are some areas where coverage is
afforded only under the NAFTA or under the WTO, but not both as
discussed earlier."2 Also, there are matters that could be brought un-
der parallel provisions of the NAFTA and the WTO, such as those
relating to sanitary and phytosanitary measures or to trade in agri-
cultural products. However, there are subtle differences. For exam-
ple, the GATT Article XX exceptions incorporated into the body of
the NAFTA SPM provisions... are not incorporated within the paral-
lel WTO agreement. Furthermore, where "non-violation" or "nullifi-
cation and impairment" actions occur, only the Chapter 20 mecha-
nism is capable of providing binding decisions, a factor that may be
important in some circumstances. '
312. See supra Part I.B (differentiating the jurisdiction of the NAFTA Chapter
20 dispute mechanism from the WTO dispute settlement mechanism).
313. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 712.
314. See DSU, supra note 2, art. XXVI (providing WTO procedures concerning
"non-violation" and "nullification and impairment" actions).
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2. Since there is no NAFTA secretariat or committee of the whole
independent of the disputing governments, there is no independent
authority in NAFTA to assure prompt choice of panelists and com-
pliance with other time requirements, even where they exist, or to
provide institutional memory independent of the governments. There
have been significant delays in the two cases to date-Agricultural
Products Tariffication"5 and Brooms316 -in part because the NAFTA
Parties have not agreed to standing rosters of panelists. Should there
be a large increase in the number of matters submitted to Chapter 20
resolution, the lack of a roster and the difficulties experienced by the
Parties in reaching agreement on acceptable panelists could lead to
very troubling delays in the system.
Notwithstanding the apparent advantages of the WTO's panel se-
lection procedures, there have been some substantial delays under
that system as well. In Dairy Product Export Subsidies, for example,
a panel was originally requested in October 1997, but panel selection
was not completed until August 1998.11
7
3. Although the final panel decision under NAFTA Chapter 20 is
binding under the system in the absence of a different negotiated set-
tlement, there is arguably stronger pressure for compliance under the
WTO, at least on paper: "[p]rompt compliance with recommenda-
tions or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members."3"8 The WTO's
record, however, despite the applicable legal provisions and a secre-
tariat to assist in implementation of panel reports, is considerably
less than perfect. The United States has charged that "[a]s the end of
the fourth year of the DSU approaches, the instances in which im-
plementation of an adverse panel report has been completed are sub-
stantially outnumbered by those in which implementation is pend-
315. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (setting forth the schedule of the
Binational Panel Review and discussing the delay in the Agricultural Products
Tariffication case, which lasted twenty-two months).
316. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (setting forth the schedule of the
Binational Panel Review and discussing the delay in the Brooms case, which lasted
seventeen months).
317. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (explaining that panel selection
constituted the primary reason for the delay).
318. DSU, supra note 2, art. 21.1.
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ing."3 '19 The United States requested DSU Review Members to con-
sider two modifications or objectives. First, the United States asked
the DSU to clarify DSU Rules "to ensure prompt implementation of
the recommendations of the DSB."' 2 Second, the United States ar-
gued that "[m]embers should not have to tolerate a situation in which
one violation of WTO obligations is simply replaced with another,
different, violation."3 2' With respect to the United States' first objec-
tive, the suggested rule clarification relates directly to the United
States unfortunate experience in the WTO Bananas action.'" As a re-
sult of the WTO Bananas action the United States has threatened re-
taliation for failure to comply with the WTO's recommendations
concerning the European Communities' regime for the importation,
sale, and distribution of Bananas.'-' The deadline was January 1,
1999, but the WTO's DSB found it necessary to reconvene the origi-
nal panel to determine whether the European Union's measures to
implement the DSB recommendation were WTO-consistent,"' and
the United States imposed trade sanctions on $500 million of Euro-
pean Union imports on March 4, 19992" The United States' second
319. See U.S. Paper on DSU Review, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 6, 1998, at 9 (re-
printing "Preliminary Views of the United States Regarding Review of the DSU").
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Bananas, supra note 153.
323. See Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning the European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 63
Fed. Reg. 63,099, 63,100 (Nov. 10, 1998) (proposing 100 percent ad valorem tar-
iffs on a list of products imported into the United States from the European Union).
324. See WTO Dispute Overview, supra note 10, at *I; see also DSU, supra
note 2, art. 21.5 (specifying that "[wv]here there is disagreement as to the existence
or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to
these dispute settlement procedures, including where possible resort to the original
panel"); see also U.S. to Request WTO Consultations with EU to Resolve Banana
Fight, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 15, 1999, at I (stating that of January 14, 1999, the
United States notified the Dispute Settlement Body that it will request authoriza-
tion for retaliation against the European Union by imposing 100 percent ad valo-
rem tariffs on about $520 million worth of European Union products exported to
the United States). The European Union sought to block such retaliation pending
the convening of a new panel to review WTO compliance. See Elizabeth Olson,
Banana Talks with Europe Turn Nasty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at C6.
325. See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Press Release: United States Takes
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objective stems from the United States' experience in the Split-Run
Periodicals case, where the United States has again threatened to re-
taliate if Canada proceeds with new legislation which will again dis-
criminate against American periodicals, thereby negating the United
States' WTO victory.326
Under the NAFTA, the prevailing party is specifically authorized
to retaliate and may do so within thirty days of the issuance of the fi-
nal panel report.327 There is no automatic adoption of panel reports,
nor an explicit provision requiring the report to be implemented, nor
a mechanism independent of the NAFTA governments to encourage
or enforce compliance, or extensive secretariat or member pressure
to comply. In short, the right to retaliate is limited only by the pro-
viso that the retaliation not be "manifestly excessive." '328 Even then,
the only remedy is the establishment of a panel by the Commission
to review the level and extent of retaliation. To date, there is no es-
tablished practice-as in the WTO-for implementation of a deci-
sion."9 In Brooms, the only NAFTA panel decision to date requiring
implementation, the United States Government waited nine months
before complying with the decision.3 Moreover, during that compli-
ance period, the Mexican government maintained in force the trade
sanctions permitted it under Chapters 8 and 20."'
Customs Actions on European hnports (visited Mar. 12, 1999)
<http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/03/99-17.html>. The United States suspended
customs liquidation of affected shipments, permitting the subsequent imposition of
one hundred percent penalty duties on all subsequent imports if no settlement is
reached.
326. See U.S. Trade Rep Threatens to Deny Canada Trade Benefits if New
Magazine Bill Passes, supra note 299 (detailing the United States' retaliatory
threats).
327. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (providing the relevant NAFTA
retaliatory provision and explaining the procedure).
328. See id.
329. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text (stating that the WTO dis-
pute settlement process lasts nine months or twelve months if there is an appeal, or
longer, but only if all disputing members agree).
330. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text (detailing the United
States' compliance schedule to the NAFTA panel report).
331. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (reporting that the retaliatory
tariffs imposed by Mexico remained in force until the United States complied with
the NAFTA panel report).
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4. Chapter 20 provides for the inclusion of nationals of the dis-
puting parties on the arbitral panels, which does not normally occur
under GATT/WTO procedures except at the appellate level."2 Fur-
thermore, a NAFTA panel is comprised of five members instead of
three.333 While securing objectivity of national panelists is potentially
difficult-a former senior United States trade official has suggested
that American panelists generally feel an obligation to bend over
backwards to be fair, while in his experience non-United States pan-
elists feel much less of an obligation3"-there may be a benefit in
some instances from familiarity with the laws and legal systems of
the two NAFTA Parties, as in Brooms, where highly technical
NAFTA provisions were at issue. Also, regional panelists may have
a broader practical knowledge of how the North American trading
system works. On the other hand, there may be fewer available
NAFTA panelists than GATT/WTO panelists with a deep knowledge
of GATT law. Aside from the few university professors and govern-
ment officials, the latter barred from NAFTA panel service,'" there
are relatively few persons with GATT expertise in North America.
Moreover, in a situation where there are no standing rosters, or even
if rosters are ultimately chosen by the NAFTA Parties, the NAFTA
Parties appear to exercise more direct control over selection of pan-
elists than is normally the case in the WTO where the Secretariat
manages the process of selecting panels.
The differences between a three person and a five person system
are subtle but significant in some cases. With NAFTA Chapter 20,
where each Party in a bilateral dispute may select two panelists, there
is added flexibility in choosing legal or non-legal expertise that may
be relevant to a specific dispute, such as a disagreement over fishing
332. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, \VTo Doc. No.
WT/DS58/AB/R, and WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, Oct. 4, 1996, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS8,10,11 /ABIR, for examples of
two WTO Appellate cases where one of the panelists was of the same nationality
as one of the Parties.
333. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing panel selection
and composition).
334. See Telephone Interview with a former USTR official (Nov. 18, 1998)
(transcript on file with American University International Law Review).
335. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2009.2(b).
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rights,336 while still being able to select an international trade law
generalist of one's choosing. The broader variety of opinions and ex-
periences may produce a more satisfactory review of the issues.37
5. There are dynamics in a multilateral process than are not present
in NAFTA's present trilateral context, in addition to the broader
"peer pressure" for compliance, noted earlier. A case brought under
Chapter 20 can, at most, incorporate two complaining Parties, as in
the Helms-Burton case."' A WTO case, in contrast, may provide the
complaining Party with the opportunity to enlist the support of non-
NAFTA nations who share the concerns of the NAFTA party, and
thus increase the political pressure on the defending Party.3 On the
other hand, the involvement of multiple interested parties may retard
a negotiated settlement, as it may be less costly in economic terms
for one NAFTA Party to reach agreement with another NAFTA
Party if the undertakings apply only to the other NAFTA Party, and
not to a larger group of WTO member nations.
6. NAFTA Chapter 20 fails to provide a process for appeals com-
parable to the WTO's standing Appellate Body, although the obliga-
tion for the NAFTA panel to circulate its report to the Parties on an
interim basis and consider comments in formulating its final report
effectively provides a limited opportunity for reconsideration.140 The
WTO's Appellate Body may be important in terms of assuring both
consistency and fairness in a rule-based adjudicatory process.
Moreover, United States lawyers and many others are comfortable
336. See Canadian Official Interview, supra note 61 (referring to actions filed
under the U.S. Free Trade Agreement concerning Pacific Coast Herring and Lob-
sters from Canada).
337. See, e.g., Softwood Lumber Agreement, supra note 55, art. V(4) (creating
an express agreement and an ad hoc dispute settlement mechanism based in part on
NAFTA Chapter 20 to successfully resolve disputes over the agreement).
338. See supra Part II.A.7 (discussing Mexico and Canada's objections to the
Helms-Burton Act).
339. In the bananas dispute, for example, United States retaliation prior to the
completion of WTO proceedings drew criticism of the United States by many
WTO members not party to the dispute. See Bananas: At WTO Meeting, Members
Blast U.S., Urge Settlement of Dispute, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Mar. 9, 1999),
available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library; supra text accompanying note 325.
340. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA Chap-
ter 20's procedure upon the issuance of a panel report).
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with a process that provides an appeal of right for any judicial deci-
sion."' On the other hand, officials have criticized recent Appellate
Body cases as being at odds with the intent of the GATT/WTO par-
ties,32 and the existence of a right of appeal may thus not be as sig-
nificant as earlier assumed.
7. Prior adopted GATT or WTO panel decisions are not binding
precedent for current WTO panels and the Appellate Body, since in-
terpretation of the WTO agreements is the responsibility of two
WTO organs, the Ministerial Conference and the General Council" '
The prior adopted decisions, however, "create legitimate expecta-
tions among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into ac-
count where they are relevant to any dispute."' ' Regardless of the
341. See generally 28 U.S.C. secs. 1291-92 (1996) (providing a right of appeal
to the United States Circuit Courts).
342. See, e.g., U.S. Uses World Trade Body to Criticize EU Over Computer
Ruling, Banana Issue, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (June 23, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (setting forth the USTR's charge that the Appellate Body's
ruling in European Communities, United Kingdom and Ireland-Customs Classifi-
cation of Certain Computer Equipment had failed to answer the question of
whether the EU had violated its agreed ceiling on computer equipment tariffs, and
left "substantial uncertainty" as to the treatment members of the VTO could ex-
pect with regard to tariffs); WTO: WTO Formnally Adopts Shrinip-Turtle Ruling as
77zailand Fears Victory May be Pyrrhic, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 9,
1998), available in LEXIS, Bnaitd Library (providing Thailand's criticism of the
WTO Appellate Body's ruling concerning import prohibitions of certain shrimp
and shrimp products). Specifically, Thailand criticized the Appellate Body for im-
properly making factual determinations-rather than confining itself to legal find-
ings-and interpreting GATT Article XX(g) relating to conservation of natural re-
sources in a manner that would encourage unilateral actions rather than
cooperation on environmental issues. See id.
343. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. IX.2 (stating that "[t]he Ministerial
Council and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt inter-
pretations of this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements," and such de-
cisions shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members).
344. WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Oct.
4, 1996, WTO Doc. Nos. WT/DS1O/AB/R, WT/DSI I/AB/IR, at 14. Unadopted
panel reports have no legal status, but could nevertheless provide a panel with use-
ful guidance. See id. at 15. Consequently, it is clear that when Art. XVI:I of the
WTO Agreement states, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided under this Agreement or
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, pro-
cedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947," the ref-
erence is not to court decisions. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). For analysis of the use
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extent to which prior GATT decisions are considered to have prece-
dential value, it can be assumed that future WTO panels-and
Chapter 20 panels as well-will both look at prior decisions, par-
ticularly those of the Appellate Body, at least for guidance, notwith-
standing the caveat against "making law. 345 Still, the sheer volume
of WTO panel and Appellate Body determinations is likely to assure
that WTO determinations will become the dominant body of interna-
tional trade decisional law, except where purely NAFTA questions
are at issue. Thus, even where dispute settlement is sought under
Chapter 20, it can be expected that current panels will rely exten-
sively on WTO and pre-1995 GATT panel decisions.4 6 In disputes
where both Parties prefer not to create a WTO precedent, however,
these considerations could make NAFTA Chapter 20 the preferred
option, as it is less likely that a WTO panel would view Chapter 20
decisions as authoritative even if they interpreted WTO provisions.
The NAFTA Chapter 19 mechanism is generally similar to the
Chapter 20 mechanism with regard to overall structure. Panel deci-
sions have been implemented by the Investigating Authorities in all
instances without delay.4 7 Despite the less political nature of the pro-
ceedings, the existence of national rosters and automatic selection of
the fifth panelist on the basis of rotation,3 8 inattention on the part of
of prior decisions in WTO practice, see Steger & Hainsworth, supra note 24, at
208-09, and Lichtenbaum, supra note 154, at 1244-48.
345. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Measure Affecting Im-
ports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Apr. 25, 1996, WTO Doc.
No. WT/DS33/AB/R, at 14 (stating that "[g]iven the explicit aim of dispute settle-
ment that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is
meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarify-
ing existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a
particular dispute").
346. See, e.g., NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Agricultural Products Tariffi-
cation, supra note 91 (citing a variety of GATT and WTO panel decisions);
NAFTA Dispute Panel Report on Brooms, supra note 91 (same).
347. See David A. Gantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA 's Chap-
ter 19; The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process to Mexico, 29 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 297, 313 (1998) (noting that no "extraordinary challenges" to
Chapter 19 panel decisions have been filed by the NAFTA parties). This contrasts
with the experience under the CFTA, where three such challenges were submitted.
See id.
348. For example, in the first case between the United States and Mexico, the
panel will have three Mexican members and two American ones. In the next case,
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the governments has resulted in endemic delay. As of January 1999,
of the eleven active Chapter 19 cases appealing decisions of the De-
partment of Commerce, six of these cases had been suspended at
some time during the proceedings, for more than six months in sev-
eral instances. 4 9 Except for High Fructose Corn Syrup, none of the
panel proceedings to date have involved issues that were simultane-
ously before Chapter 20 or WTO panels. However, several Chapter
19 actions involved antidumping duty administrative reviews in
which the underlying antidumping order had been challenged in a
prior GATT panel proceeding. 50 There have been no panels con-
vened to date under Chapter 19 to consider the consistency of new
national antidumping or countervailing duty laws with the NAFTA
or GATT/WTO rules. It is reasonable to assume, however, that
where a NAFTA Party challenges another Party's final antidumping
or countervailing duty determination at the WTO, the private inter-
ested parties will almost certainly seek review under Chapter 19 as
well.
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTY CHOICES
The cases brought before the NAFTA and WTO mechanisms can
be divided into three categories: (1) no effective choice of forum; (2)
apparent choice, with legal or political considerations in some in-
stances dictating one forum over the other; and (3) availability of
parallel fora.
the numbers will flip, with two Mexican and three United States panelists. Then
the next case will have three Mexican and two American members, and so on.
349. See NAFTA Secretariat Status Report, supra note 128; see also NAFTA
Trade Officials Break Logjam on Trade Dispute Panels, AMERICAS TRADE, Jan.
14, 1999, at 1, 10.
350. Three NAFTA Chapter 19 panel proceedings have involved Gray Portland
Cement and Clinker from Mexico, which was the subject of United States-Anti-
Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico,
Sept. 7, 1992, GATT Doe. ADP/82; another involving live swine from Canada,
related to United States-Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
from Canada, July 11, 1991, GATT Doc. DS7/R-38S/30. See also NAFTA Secre-
tariat Status Report, supra note 128.
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1. No Effective Choice of Forum
For two of the three matters actually resulting in final panel re-
ports there was effectively no choice of forum. With regard to Agri-
cultural Products Tariffcation,35' the Canadian measures under dis-
pute were clearly consistent with the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture; only the issue of NAFTA legality was in doubt. In Split-
Run Periodicals,35 the reverse was true; while the Canadian meas-
ures were covered by the "cultural industries" exception of NAFTA,
they were held illegal under GATT/WTO rules.
Also, in many of the cases that have not gone beyond consulta-
tions, a forum choice did not effectively exist. In several cases the
NAFTA Parties could seek dispute resolution only under NAFTA
because no GATT/WTO violation can be alleged to provide DSU ju-
risdiction. Small Package Delivery,3" Truck Transport,"4 and Bus
Service3. all fall within this category. Similarly, the Dairy Products
Exports Subsidies 356 WTO case, because it turns on interpretation of
the WTO Subsidies Agreement, appears to raise no NAFTA viola-
tions that could be the basis of Chapter 20 jurisdiction.
2. Effective Choice of Forum
Of the three disputes among the NAFTA parties that have resulted
in final panel reports, only one, Brooms,3" raised a clear choice of fo-
rum issue. In addition, Helms-Burton Act3 8 while ultimately referred
to the NAFTA mechanism, logically could have been brought by
Mexico or Mexico and Canada, respectively, under the WTO DSU.
The same is probably true with Restrictions on Sugar'9 and Uranium
351. See supra Part II.A.2.
352. See supra Part ILB.2.
353. See supra Part II.A.4.
354. See supra Part I.A.5.
355. See supra Part II.A. 11.
356. See supra Part II.B.3.
357. See supra Part II.A.8.
358. See supra Part II.A.7.
359. See supra Part II.A.9.
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Exports.60 In all instances, however, there were subtle reasons that
dictated the complaining Party's choice.
In Brooms, Mexico had colorable arguments that the United
States' safeguards were invalid under specific provisions of both the
NAFTA and the WTO. Why, then, did Mexico choose Chapter 20
rather than the DSU? There is some evidence of a disagreement
within the Mexican government. Some officials apparently argued
that the WTO was a more efficient process in which the appointment
of panels was more automatic and less subject to delay. Moreover,
interpretation of the NAFTA safeguard provisions applicable to
"global" safeguards actions and the "emergency action" raised tech-
nicalities that might be difficult to resolve and did not exist under
WTO Safeguards Agreement.1' Other officials favored NAFTA
Chapter 20 because of their view that it would operate more quickly
and that prompt compliance by the United States was more likely.""
Also, since Mexico had already exercised its right to retaliate by sus-
pending trade benefits under NAFTA Article 803.6, the prospect of
delays in the panel selection process under Chapter 20 was not as
daunting as it might have been had relief been deferred until the final
panel report. In retrospect, the time required for the Chapter 20 panel
decision in Brooms, even with the delay in compliance, was compa-
rable to that normally experienced in the WTO. There may also have
been a belief among the Parties that avoiding a WTO precedent on
safeguards was desirable.
The Helns-Burton matter presented Mexico and Canada with sev-
eral options. They could have joined a WTO action brought against
the United States by the European Union, challenging the legality of
the legislation under various provisions of the GATT and the General
Agreement on Trade in Services."" In this particular instance, how-
ever, the arguments that the legislation violated NAFTA may have
been stronger than the GATT arguments, because the NAFTA in-
cludes extensive provisions on investment and limited rights regard-
360. See supra Part II.A.I.
361. See Interview with former Mexican Government Official (Oct. 22, 1998)
(transcript on file with author).
362. See id.
363. See WTO Dispute Oveniew, supra note 10, at *22 (listing the dispute as
inactive).
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ing business travel.3'6 The "national security" GATT exception16'
upon which the United States expected to rely in defense of Helms
Burton at the WTO is reproduced in substantially identical form in
the NAFTA. 66 Thus, Canada and Mexico might have pursued viola-
tions of both sections of the NAFTA much more effectively under
Chapter 20 than in a WTO panel proceeding. Moreover, in retro-
spect, the settlement of the WTO case-in which President Clinton
agreed to continue to defer the availability of the private right of ac-
tion provisions of the Act and seek modification of the immigration
provision-benefited Canada and Mexico equally even though they
were not parties to the WTO action, as both might reasonably have
anticipated.
In Import Restrictions on Sugar, the Canadian government be-
lieved that the United States actions in implementing the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture violated both the Agreement and the
NAFTA and requested consultations. The NAFTA forum appears to
have been chosen because the solution was perceived to be political
rather than strictly legal, since from the American point of view the
sugar matter was linked to United States' concerns over Canadian
policies on wheat and other agricultural products, and possibly to
other disputes.367
364. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105.1 (requiring a NAFTA Party to treat
investments of another Party, wherever located, "in accordance with international
law"). Helms-Burton, by providing remedies to persons who were not United
States citizens at the time of expropriation, arguably is a violation of international
law. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1603.1 (obligating NAFTA Parties to permit
temporary entry of the business persons of other NAFTA Parties who are other-
wise qualified for entry). Helms-Burton appears to conflict with this obligation on
the part of the United States where Canadian or Mexican citizens are excluded
from entry to the United States because they are executives of firms that have
"trafficked" in Cuban property expropriated from United States citizens. See Alan
S. Lederman, Evaluation of Helms-Burton Under NAFTA, International Law and
GATT, Oct. 24, 1996, at 2-3 (on file with American University International Law
Review).
365. See GATT, supra note 18, art. XXI (stating that "[n]othing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed... (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security inter-
ests").
366. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2102.1(b).
367. See Canadian Government Seeks NAFTA Talks on U.S. Restrictions on
Sugar Exports, supra note 210.
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In Uranium Exports, Canada's 1994 consultation request under
Chapter 20 could have been made just as easily under the GATT Ar-
ticle XXIII procedures because the dispute raised national treatment
obligations under both the NAFTA and the GATT. It is important to
note that at that time the WTO DSB was not yet available. There ap-
pear to be two main reasons why Canada chose Chapter 20, both of
which are speculative. First, since the NAFTA had only recently
gone into force, Canada might have been interested in testing the
new Chapter 20 proceedings. Second, the then-existing GATT Arti-
cle XXIII alternative offered few advantages over Chapter 20 in
terms of time required and implementation of panel reports. As noted
earlier, those procedures did not assure prompt panel action, and a
single GATT Contracting Party could effectively block GATT im-
plementation of a panel report.
3. Availabiliti, of Parallel Fora
There are relatively few instances in which actions have been filed
in parallel fora, and two of the three cases have involved antidump-
ing. As noted above, where antidumping and countervailing duties
are the main issues, one can expect actions in multiple fora, as dem-
onstrated in the related Mexican sugar and high fructose corn syrup
matters.361 It is almost certain that an interested private party in an
antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding will seek review of a
national administrative decision under national law through Chapter
19, while his government in relatively rare instances simultaneously
may question the validity of the determination under the WTO Anti-
dumping or Subsidies Agreements before a WTO panel."' Of course,
the overlap here is not complete. The Chapter 19 panel is limited to
reviewing the administrative decision with regard to its consistency
with national antidumping law-which should be, but may not be,
consistent with the WTO Antidumping or Subsidies Agreements,
unless a special Chapter 19 panel convenes at the request of a
368. See supra Parts II.A.9, II.B.4 (settling issue under both NAFTA Chapter 20
and WTO Dispute Settlement Body).
369. See, e.g., United States-Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle,
Swine and Grain from Canada, Sept. 25, 1998, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS144/I (re-
flecting a matter where actions were simultaneously pending before a Chapter 19
panel and under the WTO dispute settlement system).
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NAFTA Party to determine the consistency of a Party's change in its
antidumping or countervailing duty laws with the NAFTA or the
GATT/WTO rules. However, the WTO proceeding would permit a
challenge to existing national law, or the national investigating
authority's application thereof, on the grounds that it is inconsistent
with GATT Articles VI or XVI, or the WTO Agreements on Anti-
dumping or Subsidies.
Moreover, the sugar disputes-Restrictions on Sugar and High
Fructose Corn Syrup-raise even further possibilities. Since Mexico
alleges that the American quotas violate a NAFTA side letter, pre-
sumably that issue could properly have been only raised under
NAFTA Chapter 20. The Section 301 action, since it does not allege
violations of either NAFTA or the WTO agreement, can only be pur-
sued through bilateral consultations with Mexico. 70 Whether the
Section 301 action will be pursued probably depends more on politi-
cal than legal considerations.371
From the point of view of efficiency alone, one may well question
the advisability of "balkanizing" the dispute over sugar into four
separate legal actions. There may be no obvious alternative, how-
ever, in a legally and politically sensitive matter such as this one. In
particular, Chapter 19 is not subject to the control of the NAFTA
Parties in individual cases, because it is a remedy provided of right to
the private "interested parties" in antidumping or countervailing duty
cases. A government is seldom in a position to demand that an inter-
ested party forego its right to judicial review of an administrative de-
cision imposing antidumping or countervailing duties.
370. See Initiation of HFCS Investigation, supra note 268, at 28,545.
371. See David A. Gantz, Lessons from The United States-Japan Semiconductor
Dispute, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming April 1999). The United
States does not yet appear willing to renounce use of section 301 in matters that do
not constitute violations of GATTIWTO agreements, despite the doubtful legality
of such actions. See id. Presumably, the United States can seek negotiations under
Section 301 as it wishes. See id. However, if it imposes sanctions unilaterally-
without first obtaining a WTO panel or Appellate Body decision approved by the
Dispute Settlement Body-the sanctions, which are usually 100 percent duties on
select products, presumably would be violations of GATT Article I (most favored
nation treatment) and, possibly, Article XI (restrictions on quantitative restric-
tions). See id.
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Similarly, had the case not been settled, the Tomatoes case could
have produced three separate proceedings. First, the Mexican gov-
ernment action likely would have pursued its critique of the United
States antidumping proceedings as violations of the WTO Anti-
dumping Agreement in the WTO DSB. Second, the Mexican indus-
try undoubtedly would have appealed the American antidumping
duty order to a binational panel under Chapter 19. Finally, earlier
Mexican complaints about NAFTA-based United States import re-
strictions would have presumably been pursued under Chapter 20
since Mexico alleged a NAFTA-or NAFTA side letter-violation.
The Farm Products Blockade (NAFTA) and Farm Products
Blockade (WTO) disputes also offer a basis for interesting specula-
tion. In the unlikely event that negotiations do not resolve the dis-
pute, will Canada pursue these parallel actions already filed under
Chapter 20 and the WTO? Even though technically separate "matters
or measures" have been alleged in the two fora, it is obvious that the
two parallel action involves the same dispute. This approach would
frustrate the efforts of the NAFTA drafters to protect against "double
jeopardy" by requiring a choice between the NAFTA Chapter 20 and
WTO fora, and significantly increase the administrative and other
costs of international litigation. Should two decisions ultimately be
issued there would be an obvious risk of conflicting results, and po-
tential failure to resolve the conflict definitively.
IV. RECOMMENDED CONSIDERATIONS FOR
FORUM CHOICE
What factors should the NAFTA governments and private interests
encouraging governments to act on their behalf consider in deciding
in future disputes whether to seek resolution through NAFTA or the
WTO, or perhaps both? Clearly, such decisions will be made on a
case-by-case basis, and influenced by legal, political, and practical
considerations, as well as which NAFTA Party is the complainant. It
is, nevertheless, reasonable to suggest that certain factors should be
among those carefully reviewed in reaching a decision. It may be
useful in this analysis to ask the following four questions in light of
the preceding discussion when making a determination: (1) Are there
legal requirements that dictate one forum over the other; (2) If not,
are there obvious substantive law advantages for one forum over the
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other; (3) are there procedural differences that are likely to be im-
portant; and (4) what political considerations affect the choice?
A. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS CONTROLLING CHOICE OF FORUM
As discussed earlier, certain cases must be brought under the
NAFTA or under the WTO to the exclusion of the other forum.
7 2
The following must be resolved within the NAFTA:
1. Conflicts between the NAFTA and bilateral or multilateral
agreements listed in NAFTA Article 104; and
2. Disputes under Section B of Chapter 7 or Chapter 9 relating to
human, animal or plant life or health, or protection of the envi-
ronment, or raising factual issues concerning the environment,
health, safety or conservation, including directly related scien-
tific matters.
3 73
In addition, others effectively must be resolved under the NAFTA
because there are no comparable WTO provisions to provide the ba-
sis of allegations of a violation, including:
1. NAFTA-specific regional tariff reductions in Chapter 3 and the
NAFTA rules of origin in Chapter 4;
2. NAFTA-specific customs measures in Chapter 5;
3. Inter-governmental disputes relating to the investment meas-
ures covered by Chapter 11, except for the few performance re-
quirements that are actionable under the WTO's Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs);
374
4. Matters relating to competition (Chapter 15) and to business
travel (Chapter 16).
372. See supra Part I.B (discussing jurisdictional issues under the NAFTA and
the WTO).
373. See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2005.3-4.
374. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA,
FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 139, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIMs]. Disputes between NAFTA private investors and host governments are
subject to arbitration under the mechanism provided in Chapter 11, Section B.
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5. Matters relating to government procurement (Chapter 10) in-
volving Mexico, since Mexico is not a party to the WTO
Agreement on Intellectual Property."'
Also, there remains some uncertainty as to whether the apparent
choice of forum between the NAFTA and WTO mechanisms offered
by Article 2005.1 is available when NAFTA provisions refer to
GATT rights, as in Article 802.1, but do not explicitly incorporate
the GATT provisions by reference. This issue was raised, but, un-
fortunately, not decided, in Brooms.
The principal area where NAFTA lacks jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body is in the area of antidumping and
countervailing duties. Chapter 19 is essentially the exclusive remedy
for resolving matters in these two areas, to the exclusion of Chapter
20. Chapter 19, however, provides the NAFTA Parties-as distinct
from "interested parties" before a national administrative agency-
only with a basis for challenging new national laws as inconsistent
with the WTO Antidumping or Subsidies Agreements. A NAFTA
Party challenge to existing national legislation, or the application of
such legislation in a manner allegedly in violation of one of the WTO
agreements, would have to be taken to the WTO under the DSU and
specific dispute settlement provisions of the Antidumping or Subsi-
dies Agreements, 6 unless the Parties explicitly provide for an alter-
native ad hoe forum.
3 77
375. Unlike the "multilateral trade agreements," which are binding on all WTO
Members, the "plurilateral trade agreements," including the Government Procure-
ment Agreement, are optional. See, e.g., Agreement on Government Procurement,
Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 4, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 383.
376. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 17, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 145;
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 30, FINAL
ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 229.
377. See Softwood Lumber Agreement, supra note 55, art. V (providing a forum
for resolving disputes under the Agreement, which seeks to resolve a long-running
countervailing duty action by the United States against softwood lumber from
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B. EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW ADVANTAGES.
Due to the parallel nature of most NAFTA chapters and specific
WTO agreements, the NAFTA Parties may have the luxury in many
instances of choosing the provisions that are most favorable to their
cases. For example, it can be argued that Article 301 of the NAFTA
incorporates Article III of the GATT, along with its interpretative
notes, as of January 1, 1994.378 If this interpretation is sustainable, a
Party will wish to review the elements of a possible GATT Article III
claim--over which there is both NAFTA and WTO jurisdiction-to
ascertain whether the post-1993 development of Article III is favor-
able to its position.
Where a matter arises under explicit environmental provisions of
the NAFTA, as noted earlier, Chapter 20 must be used.3 79 Other dis-
putes, however, based on measures taken for environmental reasons,
could conceivably arise. Under those circumstances, the Party de-
fending its environmental measures would most likely prefer the
NAFTA to the WTO mechanism. In both instances, the GATT
Chapter XX exceptions apply, including those relating to protection
of human, animal or plant life or health, and conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources.38 However, under the NAFTA Chapter
20, environmental measures relating to protection of human, animal
or plant life or health, and conservation of living and non-living ex-
haustible natural resources, are explicitly recognized.38'
Similarly, a dispute over whether a NAFTA Party is imposing per-
formance requirements38 2 that are in conflict with international rules
Canada.)
378. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 301.1 (stating that with regard to the goods
of another party, each Party shall comply with "Article III of the GATT and its in-
terpretive notes, or any equivalent provision of a successor agreement to which all
Parties are party [such as the GATT 1994]").
379. See supra Part IV.A (discussing cases that must be brought under the
NAFTA); NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 104, 709-24 (ch. 7, sec. B), 901-15 (ch. 9).
380. See GATT 1994, supra note 73, arts. XX(b), XX(g).
381. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2101.1 (emphasis added).
382. Examples of performance requirements are the conditioning of benefits
provided to investors on the investors' use of local raw materials or intermediate
products, exportation of a certain volume or percentage of finished product, limi-
tation of domestic sales to a certain percentage of export sales.
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could be brought under the WTO's Agreement on Trade Related In-
vestment Measures, or under Article 1106 of NAFTA. While the list
of prohibited performance requirements is longer and more detailed
in the NAFTA, there may be circumstances under which the par-
ticular requirement objected to fits more neatly under the Agreement
on Trade Related Investment Measures.' Appropriate comparisons
of the provisions relating to protection of intellectual property"M or
agricultural trade. 5 would also seem appropriate before a decision on
forum is finalized.
Additionally, where GATT principles are involved-either di-
rectly or where incorporated into the NAFTA-the analysis of legal
issues may be more likely to reflect the full body of GATT "law."
The predisposition toward the GATT will also be apparent in the in-
tentions of the negotiators, since WTO panelists are much more
likely than NAFTA panelists to be existing or former government of-
ficials who have experience in negotiating or interpreting GATT
provisions.
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DIFFERING
PROCEDURES
While the NAFTA Chapter 20 and WTO DSU procedures signifi-
cantly differ as written, both processes are still evolving, and the ac-
tual differences in some cases are more apparent than real, as indi-
cated above. Moreover, the WTO is undertaking a "review" process
which may result in changes to the WTO system that make it more
effective.3"6 No similar review is contemplated with regard to Chapter
20, although, if and when a permanent roster is appointed by the
NAFTA Parties, some of the delays relating to selection of panelists
383. See TRIMs, supra note 374.
384. Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 17, with TRIPs, supra note 27.
385. Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 7(A), with WTO Agreement on Agri-
culture, supra note 27.
386. See WTO Ministerial Decision, Decision on the Application and Review of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
33 I.L.M. 1259-60 (requiring the XVTO Ministerial Conference to complete a "full
review of dispute settlement rules and procedures" within four years of the entry
into force of the WTO agreements); see also Preliminan. Views of the United
States Regarding Review of the DSU, supra note 156, at 9. The review is not likely
to be complete before the end of 1999.
1999] 1101
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
may be reduced. The most significant procedural considerations are
summarized as follows:
1. Delays in the process are probably less likely in the WTO than
under Chapter 20, due to the existence of an independent secretariat
and a mechanism for choosing panelists from a permanent roster, de-
spite the existence of an appeal. As long as there is no permanent
NAFTA roster, a Party has some control over the proceedings simply
by drawing out the selection process, including, but not limited to,
the fifth arbitrator, who traditionally has not been a North American
national, and for which there is no mandatory choice mechanism.
Thus, a NAFTA Party that wishes to go slow initially-perhaps in
the hope that the matter may be settled-may wish to encourage dis-
pute resolution under Chapter 20 rather than at the WTO, where it is
more difficult for a Party to delay the initial proceedings.
2. In practice, panel decisions are equally binding, with one ex-
ception. The NAFTA lacks a detailed mechanism for implementation
and lacks provisions to encourage the Parties to comply within a rea-
sonable time. However, the defacto adoption of a fifteen-month pe-
riod for WTO compliance means that NAFTA results are likely to be
implemented more rapidly, since retaliation thirty days after the final
report is permitted, and there are fewer restraints on retaliation than
in the WTO. Thus, a NAFTA Party that is reasonably sure of its legal
case and will be satisfied with self-help trade retaliation measures
may well prefer Chapter 20. With "nullification or impairment"
cases, the NAFTA mechanism is preferable, because decisions based
on nullification or impairment of benefits are of the same binding
nature as those related to violations of NAFTA provisions. In con-
trast, nullification or impairment claims are subject to different rules
under the WTO DSB.
3. Whether NAFTA or WTO panelists are preferred as arbitrators,
and whether five is preferable to three, depends on the particular cir-
cumstances of the case. If the issue relies on knowledge of the
GATT, whether directly or indirectly, a WTO panel is more likely to
have expertise, given that most of the panelists are present or former
government official representatives to the GATT/WTO. If certain
aspects of the case require knowledge of the North American eco-
nomic or legal situation-as in Farm Products Blockade-or envi-
ronmental law expertise, however, it may be easier to find NAFTA
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nationals with the desired expertise, particularly where each Party
may choose two panelists. On the other hand, if the presence of the
other Party's nationals is believed to jeopardize the fairness and ob-
jectivity of the process, the WTO, with its rule against nationals of
the disputants on the panel except at the Appellate Body level, may
be preferred.
4. Theoretically, the Appellate Body of the WTO should produce a
higher degree of predictability and consistency than the single-stage
Chapter 20 process. It is not yet clear that this record will be the
norm, at least until the WTO Review defines the scope of responsi-
bility of and the use of precedent by Appellate Body members more
explicitly. Nor is it clear that NAFTA panelists are less likely to fol-
low relevant GATT/WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions than
future WTO panels, given that prior GATT or WTO panel decisions
are not binding on future panels. Both Chapter 20 panels to date have
cited GATT panel decisions extensively, as have WTO panels. On
the other hand, it is much less likely that GATTIWTO panels will
cite Chapter 20 decisions. Thus, if one or more NAFTA Parties wish
to resolve a dispute without setting a precedent that might be adverse
if similar issues are raised in the WTO-as apparently was the case
in Brooms-the Chapter 20 process is preferable.
D. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Politics is likely to be a factor in some cases, in the sense that the
Parties seek to place maximum pressure on each other toward settle-
ment. This may well lead to multiple filings, as in Restrictions on
Tomatoes (Quotas)/Mexican Tomatoes (Dumping), Restrictions on
Sugar/High Fructose Corn Syrup," and Farm Products Blockade
(NAFTA)/Farm Products Blockade (WTO).' Where a NAFTA
Party believes that it is desirable to do so, it may be able to follow
the Canadian approach in Farm Products Blockade, and avoid the
"double jeopardy" rules of the NAFTA3' by characterizing different
387. See supra Parts II.A.6, II.B. I (discussing the filings).
388. See supra Parts II.A.9, IL.B.4 (discussing the filings).
389. See supra Parts II.A.10, II.B.5 (discussing the filings).
390. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2006.6 (prohibiting a Party, once dispute
settlement proceedings have been initiated under either the NAFTA or the \VTO,
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aspects of the same dispute as separate "matters."39' The United
States may well contribute to the proliferation of parallel actions by
filing Section 301 actions relating to the principal case, as in High
Fructose Corn Syrup, even in circumstances where it is unlikely that
such unilateral approaches will be pursued. In this respect, Mexico
and Canada are at a tactical disadvantage because their laws incorpo-
rate no equivalent to Section 301.
Even where the NAFTA and WTO legal provisions are equivalent,
there may be political advantages in using the multilateral organiza-
tion over the trilateral because of the likelihood of attracting support
from other WTO members through peer pressure, including, but not
limited to, joining the action or reserving third party rights. " ' On the
other hand, a NAFTA Party may be more willing to reach a negoti-
ated settlement if the settlement need be implemented only with re-
gard to a single nation rather than for multiple plaintiffs.
Finally, a Party's track record within each forum may be a relevant
consideration in choosing a new forum. Canada and Mexico have
each won the sole case pursued by them to binational panel resolu-
tion under Chapter 20, Agricultural Products Tariffication and
Brooms, with unanimous panel decisions in each instance. The
United States has, of course, lost both cases. Whether this experience
will prejudice the official views of the American government against
the Chapter 20 process, when and if new matters arise that could be
brought in either forum, remains to be seen. The United States has
been the complaining Party in only two Chapter 20 cases, Agricul-
tural Products Tariffication and Restrictions on Small Package De-
livery, and in neither case was there a viable WTO alternative.
Canada, on the other hand, has arguably achieved at least some
satisfaction in all four of the NAFTA Chapter 20 consultations it has
initiated, Uranium Exports, Import Restrictions on Sugar, Helms-
Burton Act, and the Farm Products Blockade, and prevailed in the
only action in which it was the respondent, Agricultural Products
Tariffication. One government trade official has suggested that from
from pursuing settlement of the same dispute in the other forum).
391. See id. art. 2005.1.
392. See DSU, supra note 2, arts. 9.1, 10.1, 10.2 (indicating that the rights of
third party members covered under the agreement at issue should be taken into ac-
count).
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his point of view, that Chapter 20 is at least as successful as the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body.39 ' A Member of the Canadian Par-
liament, however, has questioned whether the NAFTA rules are as
favorable to those of the WTO and advocated consideration of a
permanent NAFTA "court." 3"
The experience of the NAFTA Parties at the WTO has been gen-
erally positive, but mixed. In the eighteen cases that were fully liti-
gated-through the Appellate Body where applicable-through
January 14, 1999, the United States, a Party in thirteen cases, pre-
vailed in seven and lost in six 9 ' The United States has prevailed at
the WTO in both cases brought against Canada, Split-Run Periodi-
cals and Dairy Products Export Subsidies. Canada, a party in four
cases, has prevailed in three, and Mexico, a party in two cases, has
prevailed in one.396 It does not appear, however, that the experience
of any of the three countries before the WTO is so far superior to its
experience under Chapter 20 that this factor alone should determine
forum choices in future disputes. Moreover, as is obvious from the
experience of the NAFTA Parties under both the NAFTA and the
WTO, the disputes are between Mexico and the United States or
Canada and the United States, not between Mexico and Canada. '
393. See Canadian Official Interview, supra note 61 (noting, inter alia, a prefer-
ence for five person over three person panels in some instances; similar enforce-
ability; and more effective remedies for non-violation "nullification and impair-
ment" matters).
394. See William C. Graham, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law
Institute Conference: NAFTA Revisited: NAFTA Vis-A-Vis the EU-Similarities and
Differences and Their Effects on Member Countries, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 123, 133
(1997) (citing the advantages of the WTO as a multilateral framework with greater
certainty and "a potential of an appeals court").
395. See WTO Dispute Overview, supra note 10.
396. See id. Three cases involved both Canada and the United States, while one
involved both Canada and Mexico. See id.
397. See also NAFTA Secretariat Status Report, supra note 128, at 2-3. Under
the Chapter 19 panel process, which reviews national antidumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations, in one of the forty-three cases brought to date, Mexi-
can steel producers have challenged a Canadian antidumping order-on injury
grounds-and in another, Canadian steel producers have challenged a Mexican
antidumping order. See NAFTA Secretariat Status Report, supra note 128, at 2-3.
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CONCLUSION
Mexico, Canada, and the United States have the unique luxury of
forum-shopping with regard to many international trade disputes.
NAFTA Chapter 20 and the WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, with their significant jurisdictional overlap, provide the NAFTA
Parties with choices available to no other members of the WTO, as
the two mechanisms differ in significant respects in scope and func-
tion. Although the choices do not in fact exist in all or even most cir-
cumstances, the limited experience to date suggests that the three na-
tions are generally taking advantage of the legal and procedural
choices offered. Hopefully, they will continue to do so, resisting the
temptation to use multiple fora for the same dispute where this prac-
tice would lead to redundancy and inefficiency.
